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A MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR
Let’s face it; we live our 
professional lives in a fish bowl. 
Our jobs are getting more and 
more difficult each year. We 
have people, not in the ring, 
second-guessing our every decision, questioning 
our motives. However, I can say this 
unequivocally, the work you do in protecting and 
serving the community that you work in is valued 
by the vast majority of Canadians. Hold your 
head high for we belong to a noble profession 
and you are community leaders.
It is unfortunate but evident that Canadian society 
is getting less and less civil. Violence against 
police officers is becoming more commonplace. 
Unfortunately some of this violence results in the 
deaths of our colleagues. As we approach the 
holiday season I want to acknowledge the pain of 
loss that this has on our community. In particular, 
our collective thoughts and prayers are with the 
surviving family members of our slain comrades.
Finally, on behalf of all the Police Academy staff, 
I wish you a healthy, safe and happy holiday 
season. 
Supt. Axel Hovbrender, 
Director of the Police Academy, 
Justice Institute of BC
IN MEMORIAL
On November 5, 2007 20-year-old 
RCMP Constable Douglas Scott was 
shot and killed after responding to 
a report of a 
drunk driver 
on the remote 
Baffin Island in Nunavut shortly 
before midnight. Dispatchers 
lost contact with Constable 
Scott after he radioed that he 
was responding to the incident.
A second constable arrived at 
the scene and located Constable Scott's body.
An RCMP Swat team was flown to the 
location and the suspect surrendered 
approximately four hours after the 
shooting.
Constable Scott had served with the RCMP for 1 year.
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page, available at 
www.odmp.org/canada.
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“Would you please add 
me to your email list for 
the “In Service 10-8” 
publication. This is a wealth of 
information for the 21st century police officer.  In 
today’s policing you need to stay on top of the latest 
case law rulings, and to do that you need to read, read, 
and read some more! With more then 25 years now in 
policing and I still learn something new each and every 
day I come to work!” - Police Constable, Alberta
*********
“Would you kindly add me to your 
electronic distribution list for the 
newsletter. I find  it an outstanding tool 
and utilize it on parade all the time to review recent 
case law decisions. Keep up the excellent work.” - Police 
Sergeant, Alberta 
*********
“I find the publication excellent for the 
case law especially !!! Thanks.” - Police 
Sergeant, Major Crimes, Saskatchewan
*********
“Thanks for the great publication. I enjoy 
reading the rulings and your analysis and 
explanations of them. Keep up the great 
work.” - Police Constable, British Columbia
*********
“Can you please put me on your 
distribution list for the 10-8 newsletter. 
I would like to keep in the loop of good 
operational police work!” - RCMP Corporal, Ontario
*********
“Just wanted to say thanks for all your 
work on such a great publication. It 
continues to grow and is always useful and 
informative. While much of my duties are in the realm 
of Administrative law, there are occasions to keep in 
mind the Charter issues concerning detention, search 
and evidence collection. Please keep up the excellent 
work!” - Regional Investigative Specialist, British 
Columbia 
*********
“I would appreciate it if you could add me 
to your mailing list for the 10-8 bulletins. 
I enjoy reading them and find them very 
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IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge your 
understanding of the law. 
Each question is based on a case featured in this issue. 
See page 47 for the answers.
1. Visitors entering a prison do not have a reduced 
“expectation of liberty” such that when they are 
subject to the rigours of the routine visitor 
screenings they are detained for Charter purposes.
 (a) True
 (b) False
2. Belief on reasonable grounds most likely resembles 
which of the following standards?
 (a) Hunch 
 (b) Reasonable suspicion
 (c) Reasonable probability
 (d) Prima facie case
 (e) Certainty
3. A vehicle search incidental to arrest must always be 
performed on the heels of an arrest (within a short 
time after arrest) or it will be unreasonable. 
 (a) True
 (b) False
4. If circumstances are such that the accused can show 
on a balance of probabilities that their statement 
was obtained in violation of their right to silence, the 
Crown will be unable to prove voluntariness beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. A police officer’s experience is relevant when a court 




6. In 2006, which province had the most Explosive 
Disposal Unit callouts to scenes involving the possible 
use of explosives?




“I wonder if you could be so kind to place 
me on your mailing list. I act for a Police 
Union in Western Australia and came 
across your publication whilst researching. The 
articles have relevance to situations WA police find 
themselves in.” -  Reader, Western Australia
*********
“A fellow member brought my attention 
to your 10-8 Newsletter. I have enjoyed 
it and found the material very 
informative. Thanks!!” - Police Constable, 
Saskatchewan 
*********
“I am a police officer in Ontario ... I have 
been reading your 10-8 newsletter on a 
regular basis and its always been a great 
tool to learn the new case laws. Keep up the good work.” 
- Police Constable, Saskatchewan
*********
“I am a 6 year RCMP member and my 
partner had directed me to your web 
page. I have not read the whole thing yet, 
but I like what I see so far.” - RCMP Constable, British 
Columbia
*********
“Could you add me to the 10-8 newsletter 
distribution list? It is  a great publication 
for street cops. I’ve been a long time 
reader and used many of the ideas and suggestions in 
my own investigations. Keep up the good work, with 
many thanks for a great service!” - Police Sergeant, 
Alberta
*********
“This is a great read whether it be new 
material or just a review! Thanks.”- RCMP 
Constable, British Columbia
*********
“I was introduced to your publication by 
our detachment commander. Finally, I can 
actually say that I enjoy reading about 
case law. Some of the folks in our office think I'm nuts 
but obviously they have yet to discover your 
newsletter.” - Police Constable, Ontario
*********
“I received a copy of your newsletter 
form a co-worker and found it not only 
hard to put down, but informative, 
educational, and of great asset to my future 
employment enrolment in law enforcement.  Keep up the 
good work.” - RCMP Auxiliary Police Constable, British 
Columbia
www.10-8.ca4




In a nutshell, the rule of stare decisis is based 
on hierarchy. Lower courts are bound to 
follow decisions rendered by the courts that 
have the power to reverse them. Since an 
appellate court out of province has no such 
power, their decisions have no binding force within this province.” 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, R. v. Vu, 2004 BCCA 230 at 
para. 27.
REASONABLE GROUNDS DOES 
NOT REQUIRE CERTAINTY
R. v. Mouland, 2007 SKCA 105
Police stopped the accused at 2:50 am 
after he was seen driving 80 km/h in a 
100 km/h zone on the Trans Canada 
Highway. He stuck his head out the 
window and asked if there was a problem. An officer 
requested a driver's licence and registration, which 
was produced. The accused had an Alberta driver's 
licence and a British Columbia registration, 
consistent with the licence plates on the truck he 
was driving. The officer questioned the accused 
about where he was going and about the ownership 
of the vehicle. He indicated he was travelling to 
Oshawa, Ontario to see his children in a pediatric 
ward and produced a piece of paper with directions 
for the hospital in Oshawa, although Oshawa was 
spelled incorrectly. He indicated that he borrowed 
the vehicle from a friend four months prior. 
After querying the information at hand, the police 
learned the vehicle was not reported stolen and that 
the owner appeared to match the registration. 
There were no outstanding warrants for the 
accused, but he had a criminal history involving 
"theft, violence, other Criminal Code offences, 
drugs, driving and failing to attend Court." The 
officer brought the accused to the backseat of his 
police vehicle where he was asked more about his 
possession of the truck. He said he was living in 
Calgary with the husband of the friend whose truck 
he borrowed. He offered to give the phone number 
of the owner of the vehicle to confirm he had 
authority to drive it, but the officer did not take 
him up on this offer. He was then questioned about 
his previous convictions, asking him what his last 
offence had been. The accused advised that he had 
been convicted of the Australian lottery fraud, that 
he had been fined $17,000 or $18,000 and that he 
had paid $7,500 of that amount. The officer then 
asked, "if I search your vehicle, am I going to find 
any other evidence of this Australian lottery fraud?" 
The accused said, "No, go ahead and have a look." 
Police conducted a brief search of the cab of the 
truck. The police then noticed there appeared to be 
a false gas tank on the truck. The accused was 
immediately arrested for possession of a controlled 
drug for the purpose of trafficking, and it was 
confirmed the tank was false; a visual inspection 
underneath the vehicle noted there were no fuel 
lines coming to or from the tank. Subsequently, the 
tank was removed and a number of bags of marihuana 
was observed. There were 15 individual bags of 
marihuana retrieved from the tank weighing 
approximately seven and one-half pounds. The 
accused was charged with possession of marihuana 
for the purpose of trafficking. 
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
the accused conceded that the initial stop and 
detention for the purpose of checking his driver’s 
licence, vehicle registration, sobriety and mechanical 
fitness of the vehicle was lawful under the general 
authority afforded to police under Saskatchewan’s 
Highway Traffic Act. However, the trial judge ruled 
that the continued detention about the Australian 
lottery scam after the initial questioning regarding 
licence and registration was unlawful. In his view, 
the original justification changed from highway 
traffic concerns to an investigative detention, for 
which there was no clear nexus between the accused 
and a recent or ongoing criminal offence. The 
continued detention was therefore arbitrary under 
s.9 of the Charter and not saved by s.1. The cursory 
search of the vehicle was unreasonable; it was 
warrantless, there were no reasonable grounds, and 
Crown had failed to establish valid consent. 
The arrest was also unlawful, ruled the trial judge, 
because the police lacked the necessary reasonable 
grounds. Although the officer believed that 
reasonable grounds existed, the objective test had 
not been met. There was no smell of marihuana, any 
drugs or paraphernalia in plain view, nor could the 
www.10-8.ca
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officer recall whether the accused was nervous. 
Instead, he formed his grounds because the accused 
was driving in the middle of the 
night; going less than the speed 
limit; put him in a defensive 
position immediately; told a 
story that was designed to 
draw sympathy; and there 
appeared to be a  false gas tank 
on the truck. These “red flags” 
were not enough to justify the 
arrest. The search that 
revealed the marihuana could 
not be justified as an incident 
to arrest and was therefore 
unreasonable. The evidence 
was excluded and the accused 
was acquitted.
The Crown appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in 
holding the continued detention to enquire into the 
Australian lottery scam breached the accused’s 
rights under s.9 and that the police lacked 
reasonable grounds to make the arrest, thereby 
negating the lawfulness of the search incidental 
thereto. Justice Smith, authoring the unanimous 
judgment for the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
upheld the trial judge’s decision that the accused’s 
s.9 rights were breached. She stated:
The police officers lacked reasonable ground to 
believe that any offence or any violation of The 
Highway Traffic Act had been committed. The 
initial stop was nonetheless not a violation of the 
[accused’s] right to be free from arbitrary 
detention only because it was authorized by law 
and justified under s. 1 of the Charter… 
However, the courts have made it clear that where 
an arbitrary stop is held to be justified under s. 1 
of the Charter, the stop is authorized for the 
limited purpose of protecting highway safety, 
including checking for sobriety, licenses, 
ownership, insurance and mechanical fitness. If 
the police go beyond this limited purpose, and 
embark upon an unfounded general inquisition or an 
unreasonable search, the stop loses the protection 
afforded by s. 1, for it can no longer meet the 
requirement … that it infringes the right of the 
individual as little as possible in order to achieve 
the accepted purpose. [references omitted, paras. 
14-15]
The request to search the vehicle was also far 
beyond a casual enquiry; it was not authorized by law 
and rendered the continued 
detention unconstitutional. The 
search was without warrant and 
without reasonable grounds. 
Valid consent was not obtained 
and the circumstances 
rendered the detention 
arbitrary and the search 
unreasonable. 
The trial judge did, however, 
err in holding that the officer 
did not have reasonable 
grounds to make the arrest. 
Reasonable grounds does not 
require certainty or even a 
prima facie case. Rather, “it is only necessary that 
the circumstances known to the officer making the 
arrest objectively indicate the reasonable 
probability that the arrestee has committed the 
crime for which he is being arrested.” In this case, 
Justice Smith ruled the trial judge imposed too high 
a standard in concluding the police objectively lacked 
reasonable grounds. 
[T]he learned trial judge appeared to dismiss the 
reliance of the police on the other “red flags” they 
had noted on the grounds that these, in 
themselves, did not constitute reasonable and 
probable grounds for arrest and that, in any case, 
a number of the normal “red flags” indicated by 
the officers were not present in this case. She 
also indicated that she believed the officers 
improperly placed some weight on the fact that 
the vehicle was registered in British Columbia. 
These points, in my respectful view, were given 
undue emphasis. 
 
The trial judge did not conclude that the officers 
discriminated by singling out British Columbia 
vehicles in relation to the initial stop. She thought 
only that this fact “may have played some part” in 
the arrest. There is, in my view, nothing inherently 
improper in an officer considering the origin of a 
vehicle as one factor among many in arriving at the 
conclusion that he has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the driver is transporting illegal drugs.
 
The so-called “red flags” were not argued to be, in 
themselves, sufficient to constitute reasonable 
and probable grounds for arrest. The fact that 
some factors were not present in this case, 
“[T]he courts have made it clear that 
where an arbitrary stop is held to be 
justified under s. 1 of the Charter, the 
stop is authorized for the limited purpose 
of protecting highway safety, including 
checking for sobriety, licenses, 
ownership, insurance and mechanical 
fitness. If the police go beyond this 
limited purpose, and embark upon an 
unfounded general inquisition or an 
unreasonable search, the stop loses the 
protection afforded by s. 1...”
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however, is, in my view, irrelevant. The “red flags” 
were never suggested to be either necessary or 
sufficient for a conclusion that a crime was 
probably being committed. The trial judge ought 
to have considered whether any of these 
circumstances, added to the belief of the false 
gas tank, gave rise to reasonable and probable 
grounds for arrest. In this case, there were 
certainly circumstances which, coupled with the 
experience of the police officers, and their belief 
that the vehicle had a false gas tank, supported 
their belief that the [accused] was probably 
transporting illegal drugs. These included the 
unusual circumstance that the [accused] was not 
the registered owner of the vehicle and claimed 
to have had it on loan for four months, and the 
“sympathy story” that he was traveling to visit 
sick children in Ontario. The officers were 
entitled to rely upon their training and experience 
that taught them that these circumstances 
frequently accompanied illegal drug transports.
 
It is my conclusion that these circumstances, 
combined with the reasonable belief that the 
truck had a false gas tank, constituted objectively 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest 
and that the trial judge, relying upon an 
improperly high standard for the establishment of 
reasonable and probable grounds, erred in 
concluding otherwise.  [paras. 24-27]
The accused’s arrest was lawful and the search that 
resulted in the discovery of the evidence was valid 
as an incident to arrest. 
Admissibility
Although the accused’s continued detention after 
the initial stop to investigate the “Australian lottery 
fraud” and the initial search of the cab of the truck 
were breaches of the Charter, they were not 
causally related to the discovery of the evidence 
sought to be excluded.  The false gas tank was 
apparent on cursory inspection and its discovery did 
not depend upon the extended detention. The 
evidence was obtained during a lawful search 
following a lawful arrest and was therefore 
admissible. The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the 
accused’s acquittal set aside, and a new trial was 
ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DELAY IN SEARCHING DID NOT 
RENDER INCIDENTAL SEARCH 
UNLAWFUL
R. v. Washington, 2007 BCCA 540
A Helijet employee suspected that a 
package shipped via Helijet from 
Vancouver to Victoria contained drugs 
and opened it for inspection.   After 
seeing a white powder he believed to be cocaine, the 
employee re-sealed the package and called police.  
When police arrived the package was re-opened, a 
sample taken, and the powder was subsequently 
recognized to be methamphetamine in its crystal 
form.  
Shortly thereafter, the package, which was 
addressed to “Nicole Washington”, was picked up at 
the Helijet terminal by the accused Washington, who 
was accompanied to the terminal by co-accused 
Shepherd.  The two women were arrested by the 
police as they got into a car to leave the terminal. 
The vehicle was towed to the police station and 
searched almost an hour later later, rather than in 
front of the busy terminal. In it, police found more 
evidence including methamphetamine, cash, small 
baggies, cell phones, scales, and identification. Both 
women were jointly charged with possession of 
methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accuseds were convicted. The trial judge concluded 
that the Helijet employee was not an agent of the 
state and therefore his actions did not amount to a 
search. He found the search of the package was not 
unreasonable and this provided the police with 
proper grounds to make the arrest. The search of 
the vehicle was reasonable as it was incident to 
arrest; to ensure the protection of the police and to 
preserve and discover evidence. He concluded that 
there were no Charter breaches and, even if there 
were, he would not have excluded the evidence under 
s.24(2). The accuseds were thus convicted.
They then appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other things, that their rights 
under s.8 of the Charter were breached when police 
searched the package. They also submitted that the 
police did not have reasonable grounds to make the www.10-8.ca
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arrest and that the search of their car was not 
incidental to arrest.
Police Search of the Package
The accuseds argued that they had a privacy 
interest in the package and retained that interest 
despite the Helijet employee opening it. Hence, 
when the police searched it without a warrant they 
breached s.8 of the Charter. The Crown, on the 
other hand, submitted that the accuseds lost any 
constitutionally protected privacy interest in the 
package once it was opened and inspected by the 
employee. Thus, the police actions did not violate s.8. 
Justice Ryan, authoring the decision for the 
majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
ruled the accused maintained a privacy interest in 
the package when it was opened by the Helijet 
employee and re-sealed. By the time the police 
arrived at the terminal the powder had been 
returned to the package. When the police opened it 
and examined its contents without proper grounds 
and without a warrant, they breached the accuseds’ 
rights to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure. 
Justice Ryan then went on to consider whether the 
evidence was admissible as a result of the police 
searching the package. She found the evidence was 
non-conscriptive and therefore would not affect the 
fairness of the trial. As for the seriousness of the 
breach, the expectation of privacy in the package 
was not as high as that related to bodily integrity or 
a home or office. Although the police did not have 
sufficient grounds to get a warrant (until they 
opened the package) and there were not exigent 
circumstances, they did not act flagrantly or in bad 
faith. The evidence was crucial to the Crown’s case 
and the charges were serious. The evidence was 
therefore admissible.
Reasonable Grounds
The accuseds contended that the police did not have 
objective grounds to arrest them for being in 
possession of the drugs because there was nothing 
to indicate they knew the package contained drugs. 
Justice Ryan disagreed. In her view, the police had 
grounds to believe the package contained 
methamphetamine when its contents were examined 
by police at the terminal.  The consignee of the 
package, Washington, arrived to pick it up shortly 
after it arrived and it was a reasonable inference 
that she likely knew it was being sent to her. At this 
point, the police had reasonable grounds to arrest 
her. 
Her co-accused, Shepherd, was with Washington 
when she picked up the package. Rather than placing 
the package in the trunk or putting it on the back 
seat, Washington handed the package to Shepherd 
who was then in physical possession of it when 
arrested. There were reasonable grounds to arrest 
both of them. 
Vehicle Search
Since the accuseds were lawfully arrested their 
vehicle could be searched as an incident to arrest. 
They argued however, that because the search was 
conducted almost an hour after the arrests, the 
search became unlawful. A search incidental to 
arrest will usually occur within a reasonable time 
after arrest. However, a substantial delay will not 
automatically render a search unlawful if there is a 
reasonable explanation for it. Here, the police said 
they towed the vehicle to the police station because 
there was traffic in front of the Helijet terminal. 
This was a sensible explanation accepted by the trial 
judge. The search, therefore, remained an incident 
of a lawful arrest.
A Minority View
Justice Rowles agreed with the majority that the 
accuseds’ reasonable expectation of privacy was not 
interrupted when the employee opened the package 
and the police breached s.8 when they opened it. 
They did not have a warrant nor reasonable grounds 
to obtain one. Nor did security concerns prompt its 
opening. She did, however, disagree that the 
evidence was admissible. In her view the evidence 
should have been excluded, the appeals allowed, and 
the convictions set aside. 
The accuseds appeals were dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“A judge is a law student who marks his own 
examination papers.” - H.L. Mencken
www.10-8.ca8
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GOOD AND BAD FAITH LIE ON 
A CONTINUUM
R. v. Nguyen, 2007 ONCA 645
The police were investigating out-of-
area individuals and groups purchasing 
residential properties of patterned 
description for use as marijuana grow 
houses.  Their investigation revealed that the 
accused had recently opened a hydro account and 
the average daily use of hydro was greater than 
that for similar houses. This was consistent with a 
house being used as a marijuana grow operation. A 
neighbour told police that no one had ever been seen 
outside the property, a gray van had been parked in 
the driveway, there was always a light on in the living 
room area, windows were always drawn, the mailbox 
was never checked, and garbage never put out.  
More police surveillance was conducted and a gray 
van with a non-functioning tail-light was stopped.  
The accused was the driver and she lied to the 
police about where she was coming from. A search 
warrant was obtained and executed. 
The front entrance was locked so the lead officer 
instructed that the door be forced open with a 
battering ram. There was no knock and notice given  
before doing so. The search revealed that two of 
three bedrooms were being used to grow marijuana 
—one contained marijuana plants while the other 
was fitted with lights, fans and ventilation generally 
used in marijuana grow operations. The accused was 
located huddled in a corner of the basement and her 
purse contained keys for the gray 
van, as well as an address book with 
a list of fertilizers suitable for 
growing marijuana.  She was 
charged with producing marihuana, 
possession, and possession for the 
purpose of trafficking. As well, she 
was charged with theft of 
electricity. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice, the accused 
challenged the manner of the 
warrant’s execution because of the 
police failure to knock and announce 
before breaching the front door 
and entering. The trial judge 
agreed that the failure to knock and seek 
permission breached s.8 of the Charter, but the 
evidence was admitted under s.24(2). The accused 
was convicted and sentenced to 15 months in jail, 
ordered to pay $10,000 to Hydro One, placed on 
probation for one year, and given a weapons 
prohibition. 
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, the trial judge erred in 
admitting the evidence pursuant to s. 24(2).   She 
contended that the trial judge erred in holding, 
among other considerations, that there was 
uncertainty in the law regarding the knock and 
notice rule when executing a search warrant and in 
assessing the seriousness of the breach; that it  
was not serious and whether the police acted in 
good faith. 
Section 24(2) of the Charter requires a court weigh 
three factors in determining whether evidence 
should be excluded: (1) the admission of the 
evidence on the fairness of the trial, (2) the 
seriousness of the Charter violation, and (3) the 
effect of excluding the evidence on the 
administration of justice. Justice LaForme, writing 
the opinion of the Ontario Court of Appeal, upheld 
the trial judge’s ruling. 
Before addressing the accused’s submissions, 
Justice LaForme briefly reviewed the “knock and 
notice” principle. Under the common law police 
officers must make an announcement before entry, 
except in exigent circumstances. In the ordinary 
case police officers, before forcing entry, should 
give notice of presence (by knocking 
or ringing the doorbell), notice of 
authority (by identifying 
themselves as law enforcement 
officers) and notice of purpose (by 
stating a lawful reason for entry).  
This common law principle has 
become known as the “knock and 
notice” rule.   In drug cases, the 
knock and notice rule has since been 
supplemented by s. 12 of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act, which states that a peace 
officer may use as much force as is 
necessary in the circumstances 
when exercising any of the powers 
“[Section 12 of the CDSA]  
permits the police to enter a 
home with a certain degree of 
force, without announcing their 
presence, in exigent 
circumstances, where there is a 
need for officers to act and enter 
without giving prior notice.  These 
circumstances include when 
there is a fear for the safety of 
persons within the premises and 
concern for the destruction of 
evidence, as well as, at times, 
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Her reasons, however, strongly suggested that she 
viewed the police conduct as amounting to good 
faith.  
The accused submitted that in cases involving a 
dwelling house, the absence of “knock and notice” 
and exigent circumstances must result in an 
absence of good faith. This, by itself, would mean 
that the breach is so serious as to require its 
exclusion.  Justice LaForme did not agree. He 
described police misconduct as being a continuum, 
ranging from a good faith error to a blatant 
disregard for constitutional rights. 
In this case, the trial judge viewed the police 
conduct as falling nearer to the good faith end of 
the continuum. And even if she did make a mistake 
about the good faith of the police, it is only one 
factor to consider in the 24(2) analysis. Her 
assessment of the seriousness of the breach also 
included:
• a reasonable belief by police that the premise was not 
being used as a dwelling at the time the warrant was 
executed; 
• the decision to enter without knock and notice was 
based on a genuinely held belief that it was safer to 
do so in the circumstances and based on the officer’s 
fear of the unknown in the context of a drug bust and 
the dangers he knew sometimes occur; 
• the officer has employed knock and notice in other 
instances where he knew enough about the persons or 
circumstances within to alleviate the concern for a 
violent greeting if persons inside had the time to 
organize it; 
• the ultimate decision to enter without knock and 
notice was not made exclusively on the basis of a 
police policy; 
• when the officer later came to have clear legal 
direction regarding “knock and notice”, he thereafter 
complied with the direction; 
• the otherwise reasonable manner in which the warrant 
was executed, which included the fact that uniformed 
officers announced their presence as police several 
times, and the fact that officers holstered their 
weapons as soon as they realized that the accused and 
another occupant, who would not present themselves 
upon command and were hiding in the basement, were 
not a threat; and 
• the fact that the officers operated under a lawfully 
issued judicial authorization to search.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and the 
conviction upheld.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
described in s.11. Justice LaForme described this 
provision as follows:
This section permits the police to enter a home 
with a certain degree of force, without 
announcing their presence, in exigent 
circumstances, where there is a need for officers 
to act and enter without giving prior notice.  
These circumstances include when there is a fear 
for the safety of persons within the premises and 
concern for the destruction of evidence, as well 
as, at times, concern for the officer's own safety. 
[para. 22]
Uncertainty in the Law
In this case, the trial judge did not hold that there 
was uncertainty in the law surrounding the knock 
and notice rule. Rather than adopting a rule that 
would result in the automatic exclusion of evidence 
in the circumstances of failure to knock and 
announce, the trial judge “merely observed that if 
evidence gathered in violation of the ‘knock and 
notice’ rule were always excluded, then this would 
conflict with the recognized fact that s. 24(2) 
jurisprudence is ‘uncertain’ in that there are no 
‘bright lines’ to warn the police about how to act in 
a given situation.”  The trial judge’s comment about 
“uncertainty in the law” came from cases referred 
to concerning searches based on a formal police 
policy holding there was no breach or, if a breach, 
it was not serious enough to justify excluding the 
evidence.  
The trial judge found that if she were to rely on 
the accused’s submission that automatic exclusion 
of evidence should follow a breach of the knock and 
notice rule, then only one fact would determine the 
multi-faceted fact-driven analysis under s. 24(2). A 
court must “consider all of the circumstances 
rather than focus on the knock and notice rule to 
the exclusion of everything else.” The trial judge 
made no error. 
Seriousness of the Breach 
In deciding whether a breach is serious, a number 
of factors are examined, including the 
obtrusiveness of the search, the individual’s 
expectation of privacy in the area searched, the 
existence of reasonable grounds, and whether the 
breach was committed in good or bad faith.  In this 
case the trial judge did not specifically find the 
police acted in neither good faith nor bad faith.  
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NO CHARTER BREACH IN 
AMBULANCE RIDE WITH 
IMPAIRED DRIVER 
R. v. LaChappelle, 2007 ONCA 655
At about 9:45 p.m. the accused’s 
vehicle crossed the centre line and 
collided with an oncoming vehicle, 
killing its driver and injuring the 
passenger. The accused, an off duty police officer, 
was also injured.  Some witnesses at the scene, 
including another off-duty police officer, noted 
that the accused had been drinking and told the 
responding sergeant that he thought the accused 
had alcohol on his breath. Once it was suspected 
that the accused had been drinking, an officer was 
assigned to stay with him. The officer rode with 
the accused in the ambulance and noted an odour of 
alcohol and that he was answering the paramedics’ 
questions with one-word answers and hand gestures 
as if he was attempting to avoid talking. The officer 
did not speak to the accused while he was in the 
ambulance. 
The officer stayed at his side for some of the time 
at the hospital, again noting the accused was trying 
to avoid talking, instead using gestures or one-word 
answers.  About thirty minutes after they arrived 
at the hospital, the officer saw the accused put 
some gum in his mouth and told him he should not be 
eating anything. At this time, the accused 
recognized the officer from Police College and 
addressed her by name.  The officer noted that his 
speech was slurred, his eyes were red and 
bloodshot, and he still had an odour of alcohol 
around him. 
On orders from a physician, a nurse took five vials 
of blood for medical purposes, to which the accused 
did not object.  The vials remained in the officer’s 
sight until a detective arrived at the hospital.  The 
detective watched the vials until they were placed 
in a laboratory refrigerator.  At that time, he 
placed Centre of Forensic Sciences seals on the 
remaining vials.   
Forty-five minutes after the hospital blood samples 
were taken, the accused went for X-rays.  The 
officer did not accompany him but concluded she 
had grounds to arrest him for impaired driving.  
Accordingly, when the accused returned, he was 
arrested, read his rights under s. 10(b) of the 
Charter, and given a breath demand.  He said he 
understood the demand and would comply.  He then 
said he wished to speak to duty counsel and he had 
a fifteen minute private conversation.  After the 
call, the officer told the accused that the charge 
would now be impaired driving causing death and 
asked him if he still wanted to provide breath 
samples.  He agreed and the samples were taken 
about four hours after the collision. The officer’s 
presence did not interfere with any treatment and 
the ambulance and hospital staff consented to her 
presence. At no time did the accused object to the 
officer’s presence. Two days later, the detective 
called the hospital and confirmed the existence of 
a blood chemistry report.  He then obtained a 
search warrant to seize the vials and the report, 
which contained a blood/alcohol analysis.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 
the Crown led evidence of drinking and tendered 
evidence of the results of the breath tests 
performed by police and the analysis of the blood 
samples taken at the hospital for medical purposes. 
A hospital technician testified that if further 
medical tests had been needed, she could have 
broken the seals and used the vials.  She also 
testified that vials of blood that are not necessary 
for medical purposes are ordinarily destroyed. An 
expert testified that the accused’s blood would 
have been somewhere between 130 and 210mg% at 
the time of the collision. He was convicted of 
impaired driving causing death and impaired driving 
causing bodily harm and sentenced to a total of 21 
months imprisonment and banned from driving for 
five years. 
The accused appealed his conviction to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, (i) 
that the officer’s presence in the ambulance 
violated his privacy rights, (ii) the taking of blood 
samples without consent by hospital personnel and 
the placement of seals on the vials of blood that 
had been taken for medical purposes violated s. 8 
of the Charter, (iii) he was detained while in the 
ambulance and the hospital and therefore his rights 
under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter were violated, and 
(iv) the breath demand was not lawful because it 
was not made as soon as practicable.
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Justice Rosenberg, authoring the unanimous opinion 
of the Court of Appeal, dismissed the appeal and 
upheld the conviction. 
The Ambulance Ride
The accused contended that the officer violated 
his right to privacy and seized information from 
him by observing his interaction 
with the ambulance personnel when 
she remained with him in the 
ambulance while he was 
transported to the hospital.   This 
information was later used by the 
officer to form her grounds for 
the breath demand and may have 
been some of the information used 
by the detective to obtain the 
search warrant. The trial judge 
found that the officer’s non-
intrusive presence with the 
consent of the ambulance 
personnel did not breach the 
accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Accordingly, there was no violation of the accused’s 
s. 8 rights in the ambulance.
Justice Rosenberg upheld the trial judge’s 
reasoning. He stated:
In my view, the mere fact that [the officer] 
accompanied the [accused] in the ambulance did 
not violate his s. 8 rights, even if the [accused] 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to the ambulance.  Section 8 is only 
engaged if there is a search or seizure.  In this 
case, the [accused] claims that information was 
seized by [the officer] because she was able to 
observe his interaction with the ambulance 
attendants.   The Supreme Court has dealt with 
informational privacy in several cases. 
………
In my view, when the [factors respecting 
informational privacy] are considered, the 
[accused] did not make out a violation of his s. 8 
rights. The information about which the 
[accused] complains was [the officer’s] 
observations that the [accused] was 
communicating using one-word answers or 
gestures.   She inferred from this conduct that 
the [accused] was attempting not to speak.  This 
kind of information was not of a highly 
confidential nature.  [The officer] was able to 
make the same observations later at the hospital.  
There is no suggestion that the words or the 
gestures conveyed any kind of confidential 
information. [The officer] did not question the 
[accused] in the ambulance or attempt in any 
other way to obtain incriminatory evidence from 
the [accused]; she was merely making 
observations.
As to the place where the information 
was obtained, the [accused] had no 
property interest in the ambulance and 
no control over who rode in it.  The trial 
judge found that the people who did have 
control over the ambulance, the 
ambulance personnel, impliedly consented 
to [the officer] being present.  [The 
officer’s] presence did not in any way 
interfere with the [accused’s] medical 
care.  The [accused] did not testify that 
he was inhibited by [the officer’s] 
presence in the ambulance.
Finally, the offence under investigation 
was a most serious one.  The acts of [the 
officer] in passively observing the [accused] in 
the ambulance were wholly proportionate to the 
seriousness of the situation.  [paras. 34-38]
In applying the contextual approach, Justice 
Rosenberg concluded that the accused’s rights 
under s. 8 of the Charter were not violated. 
Hospital Blood Samples
There was absolutely no evidence that the 
physician who ordered the blood samples taken or 
the nurse who took them were acting as agents of 
the state or that they took the samples with the 
intention of sharing the blood or the results of any 
analysis with the police. The hospital personnel took 
blood samples only for medical reasons and, 
accordingly, s. 8 of the Charter was not engaged. 
Sealing the Blood Samples
The act of the detective placing seals on the vials 
of blood that had originally been taken for medical 
purposes did not constitute an unreasonable seizure 
in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.  Even though the 
blood samples would undoubtedly have been 
destroyed before the police could have lawfully 
obtained the evidence through a search warrant, 
sealing vials of blood that remained under the 
“In my view, the mere fact 
that [the officer] 
accompanied the [accused] 
in the ambulance did not 
violate his s. 8 rights, even 
if the [accused] had a 
reasonable expectation of 
privacy with respect to the 
ambulance.  Section 8 is 
only engaged if there is a 
search or seizure.”
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control of the hospital in the event they were 
needed for medical purposes until a search warrant 
could be obtained was not an unreasonable seizure.
Detention
The accused’s submission that the officer detained 
him in the ambulance and at the hospital violated 
his rights under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter had no 
merit. The officer did nothing to detain him.  She 
did not make any demand or give any direction that 
resulted in his physical or psychological detention.  
Rather, he was “detained” by his injuries from the 
collision.
As Soon As Practicable
The accused argued that the officer intentionally 
delayed arresting him and demanding the breath 
sample and had already formulated the grounds for 
making the breath demand before the blood 
samples were taken. Had she acted expeditiously, 
he would have spoken to counsel and learned that he 
could withhold his consent to the taking of the 
blood samples.   But the trial judge concluded the 
demand was made as soon as practicable.  The 
question of when the officer formed her grounds 
for arrest and giving the breath demand was a 
factual issue and there was no basis for interfering 
with the trial judge’s conclusion.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LACK OF SUBJECTIVE BELIEF 
FATAL TO REASONABLE 
GROUNDS
R. v. LeBlanc, 2007 NBCA 24
Police investigators obtained 
information from several confidential 
sources. On the basis of this 
information, a search warrant was 
obtained allowing officers to enter 
and search the vehicles, the out-houses and the 
dwelling house occupied/utilized by the accused. 
Anticipating receipt of a search warrant, police 
officers undertook surveillance of the premises. 
One of the officers involved in the surveillance, a 
24-year officer had earlier read the information to 
obtain and the “search warrant” that was being 
sought. He had personal knowledge relating to the 
accused, having had previous dealings with him for 
drug related matters over the years and other 
Criminal Code investigations. Furthermore, the 
officer’s own reliable and confidential sources had 
recently informed him that the accused had been 
known, at different times, to leave his residence 
and make drug transactions with vehicle occupants 
outside the house or on the sidewalk, and also that 
he had been known to leave the residence whether 
on foot or by vehicle and that he would be carrying 
drugs with him at that time. 
 
In the course of the surveillance, the officer 
observed the accused leave his residence, briefly 
return to the house, then enter a motor vehicle and 
drive off. The officer followed him directly to a 
post office and observed him enter it and about 10 
minutes later, leave the building while talking on his 
cell phone. At that point, the officer approached 
the accused, identified himself, and arrested him 
for trafficking in narcotics. He was handcuffed, , 
searched, and cocaine was found on his person. 
Oxycodone and marihuana was also found in his 
room at his residence. As a result, the accused was 
charged with possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking, possessing oxycodone for the purpose 
of trafficking, and possessing marihuana. 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the judge 
found the search warrant invalid. The officer 
arresting the accused testified that he proceeded 
with the arrest based on his own personal 
knowledge of the accused and the information he 
read that was filed with the search warrant. The 
trial judge noted that the “Criminal Code requires 
that an arresting officer must subjectively have 
reasonable and probable grounds on which to base 
the arrest. And as well, the arrest must be 
justifiable from an objective point of view.” Here, 
the trial judge ruled that there was not enough of 
a precise pattern established to say that there 
were reasonable grounds to arrest. Since the 
arrest was unlawful it breached s.9 of the Charter 
and the search of the accused was also invalid 
because it was not incidental to a lawful arrest. The 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2) and the 
accused was acquitted.
The Crown appealed the acquittal to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal arguing the judge erred 
in finding the accused’s rights under s.9 were 
violated. The Crown submitted that the wrong test 
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was applied in assessing the existence of objective 
reasonable grounds and in finding the search 
unreasonable under s.8. The Crown also contended 
that the evidence should have been admitted under 
s.24(2) in the event of the Charter breaches. 
Under s.495 of the Criminal Code, the officer was 
empowered to arrest the accused if he believed, on 
reasonable grounds, that he committed the offence 
of trafficking. Not only must the officer personally 
believe that the accused trafficked in a controlled 
substance, but it had to be objectively established 
that those grounds did in fact exist. In this case, 
Justice Richard, for the unanimous New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal, found it was unnecessary to 
determine whether the objective test had been 
met. In his view, the trial judge foreclosed the 
existence of reasonable grounds by holding that 
the officer did not possess the requisite subjective 
belief. He stated:
In my view, the trial judge’s conclusion on the 
subjective component of the reasonable grounds 
requirement was neither unreasonable nor 
unsupported by the evidence. In the course of a 
voir dire conducted for the very purpose of 
determining whether items seized from [the 
accused] should be excluded at trial, and where 
the lawfulness of the arrest was a key issue, [the 
officer] was unable to clearly articulate his 
reasons for arresting [the accused]. In direct 
testimony, he said that he “placed him under 
arrest for trafficking in narcotics.” In cross-
examination, he initially agreed that he “arrested 
him for possession for the purpose of trafficking” 
but then, when confronted with a contradiction 
between his testimony and his notes, he 
backtracked and admitted that he arrested him 
for “trafficking in narcotics” and not for 
“possession for the purpose of trafficking.” 
Moreover, despite testifying that he had read 
the ITO and the search warrant, that he was 
personally aware of [the accused’s] criminal 
background and that he had personal information 
from his own confidential and reliable sources, 
[the officer] did not identify any particular 
transaction that formed the basis for the arrest. 
[The officer] testified that he told [the accused] 
that he was under arrest for trafficking but again 
did not identify any particular transaction that 
constituted the indictable offence for which he 
should have had reasonable grounds to arrest. 
Under cross-examination, [the officer] 
acknowledged that the information he had 
received from his own sources could have been 
“over a period of a few weeks, a few months.”
A review of the record leaves a lingering air of 
uncertainty as to the precise offence and 
transaction that could have been contemplated by 
the officer when he arrested [the accused].
 
Considering the vague nature of [the officer’s] 
testimony in the course of a voir dire held for the 
very purpose of determining whether items seized 
in the course of a search incidental to the arrest 
should be excluded, and where the lawfulness of 
the arrest played a pivotal role, it is not surprising 
that the trial judge concluded that she was “not 
satisfied that there has been a precise enough 
pattern established to say that there are 
reasonable and probable grounds for arrest[ing the 
accused] for trafficking.” … I understand her words 
in that regard to apply as much to the subjective 
component as to the objective component of the 
reasonable grounds requirement. In my view, her 
conclusion in this regard is neither unreasonable nor 
unsupported by the evidence. [paras. 23-25]
Since the trial judge was not satisfied the officer 
had the necessary subjective belief required for 
reasonable grounds, the arrest was, for that reason, 
unlawful. Whether or not the objective test was 
satisfied was irrelevant. The trial judge’s ruling that 
the arrest constituted a s.9 Charter violation, which 
led to a s.8 breach was proper.
As for the exclusion of evidence, the trial judge 
applied the three stage test under s.24(2) and her 
conclusions were not unreasonable. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Grounds
“First, the arresting officer must believe 
that he or she has [reasonable] grounds 
to arrest the accused. This is the 
subjective requirement. Second, there 
must be objectively discernible facts which 
give the arresting officer reasonable cause to believe that 
the accused is criminally involved in the matter for which he 
is arrested. This is the objective component of the 
[reasonable] grounds requirement.” - Ontario Court of 
Appeal Justice Osborne, R. v. Hall (1995) 22 O.R. (3d) 289 
(Ont.C.A.) 
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REDUCED EXPECTATION OF 
‘LIBERTY’ WHEN ENTERING 
PRISON
R. v. Vandenbosch, 2007 MBCA 113
The accused attended a federal 
penitentiary to visit an inmate for the 
fifth time.  Upon entering the 
penitentiary grounds, there were 
several signs posted as prescribed by s.62 of the 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA). 
There was a large sign posted advising that all 
“persons on this property may be searched” and that 
certain items (such as non-prescription drugs and 
illegal narcotics) “may be confiscated and criminal 
charges laid against the person bringing them onto 
the property.” Immediately behind that sign, there 
was another one that stated all persons “are subject 
to search.” Finally, at the visitor control point in the 
main lobby, there was another sign stating, 
“Authorized security measures are being taken to 
observe and inspect visitors to this institution.  No 
visitors are obliged to submit to a search of their 
person, or personal belongings if they choose not 
to visit.” 
Once past the main entrance, the accused (like all 
visitors) was subject to a visual inspection, asked to 
sign in, told to store personal property not allowed in 
the penitentiary in a locker, directed to walk 
through a metal detector and an x-ray machine, and 
instructed to submit two pieces of personal 
identification for an Ionscan test. This last check 
was used to detect the residual presence of certain 
drugs on the identification.  
The Ionscan test indicated a positive reading. It did 
not mean the accused was carrying drugs, but simply 
indicated the piece of identification submitted had 
been in contact with drugs.  She was asked to follow 
two corrections officers into an interview room, 
where an assessment to determine the risk 
associated with a visit (the visitor-risk assessment) 
was conducted. The purpose of this assessment was 
to determine the type of visit, if any, that would be 
permitted.  It is conducted every time Ionscan 
results are positive.
In this case, the visitor risk assessment lasted 
approximately ten minutes. The corrections officers 
explained their interest in keeping drugs out of the 
penitentiary and told the accused, in light of the 
positive reading generated by the Ionscan detector, 
that they were going to conduct the visitor-risk 
assessment.  The accused was told of the possible 
outcomes of such an assessment:   an open visit, a 
visit under observation, a security booth visit or a 
denial of a visit altogether. When asked if she had 
any drugs on her she denied she was carrying any.  
The corrections officers then said they knew she 
had been asked to make a delivery of drugs to one of 
the inmates (even though they had not actually 
received such information).  She was given factual 
information regarding the prospect of detention and 
police involvement. After she was asked a third time, 
she admitted that she had secreted drugs on her 
person. 
It was at that point that the corrections officers 
determined they had reasonable grounds to believe 
that the accused was carrying drugs.   She was 
advised she would be detained and searched.   She 
met privately with two female corrections officers 
and produced a condom, containing 21 grams of 
marijuana and nine morphine pills, which she had 
hidden in her vagina. A corrections officer then read 
her right to counsel pursuant to s. 60(4)(b) CCRA.  
The police were called and the accused was charged 
with two counts of possession for the purpose of 
trafficking.
At trial in the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench, the 
judge found the accused was free to leave the 
penitentiary at any time and was aware that she was 
subject to search upon entering. The judge ruled the 
accused’s statement that she possessed drugs 
voluntary and that she was not detained during the 
visitor-risk assessment; it was a relatively brief 
routine administrative process. Only after admitting 
she had drugs was she sufficiently detained to 
engage her Charter rights. However, failing to 
advise the accused about her right to counsel before 
the search was conducted rendered the search 
unreasonable. The evidence was nonetheless 
admitted under s.24(2) of the Charter. She was 
convicted on both counts and sentenced to a total of 
four months in jail followed by two years probation. 
The accused appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal arguing she was sufficiently detained to 
trigger her s.9 and/or 10(b) Charter rights. She 
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suggested that she was detained when she was 
directed to enter the interview room by the 
correctional officers, escorted through two locked 
doors, and then questioned in a manner that 
amounted to an interrogation designed to elicit an 
incriminating statement. As well, she insisted that 
she was psychologically detained because she 
reasonably believed she had no choice but to comply 
—she was never told she had the option of leaving. 
As well, because she had not yet intermingled with 
the prisoner population, she argued she did not have 
a reduced expectation of privacy. Finally, she said 
the corrections officers did 
not comply with the CCRA 
requiring them to inform a 
person they have the right to 
leave when reasonably 
suspected of carrying drugs.
The Crown, on the other hand, 
argued that there is a reduced 
expectation of privacy in 
prisons for public policy 
reasons and that this reduced 
expectation has relevance to 
ss.9 and 10(b) of the Charter. 
The visitor-risk assessment is a routine 
administrative process, similar to border processes, 
and does not result in a Charter detention. The 
Crown also contended that the CCRA requires 
officers to tell a person they may leave prior to 
being strip searched, not when they form the 
reasonable suspicion the individual has drugs. 
Detention?
Justice Chartier, in writing the opinion of the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal on the issue of detention, 
first noted that detentions are highly fact-driven. 
The totality of the circumstances must be evaluated 
with regard to “what is said and done, in what 
manner, in what location and for what purpose.” And 
unless there is a finding of detention the 
constitutional protections afforded by ss.9 and 
10(b) of the Charter are not triggered. 
After reviewing several cases respecting detentions 
of visitors in a prison setting, Justice Chartier noted 
the following propositions:
1)    when an individual visits a prison, there is a 
reduced expectation of privacy; 
2)   Charter concerns will generally be engaged when 
prison officials single-out an individual and step 
outside the routine administrative search 
processes by pre-arranging a plan to detain and 
search that person; and  
3)   Charter concerns will generally not engage unless 
the purpose of the intervention by prison 
officials has changed from a preventative 
objective (preventing drugs and weapons from 
entering the prison) to one of law enforcement 
(arrest and charge).   
In answering the question whether a 
visitor-risk assessment in a prison was 
sufficient to amount to a 
constitutional detention, Justice 
Chartier concluded that not only is 
there a reduced expectation with 
respect to privacy when one visits a 
prison but also there is a reduced 
expectation of liberty, similar to the 
restraints and investigative processes 
when one enters Canada and is 
subjected to customs and immigration 
inspection. He stated:
It is well recognized that there is a real need to 
ensure that individuals who are entering a prison 
environment do not bring with them weapons or 
drugs.  The courts have recognized this legitimate 
purpose by acknowledging that in a prison 
environment there is a reduced expectation of 
privacy when it comes to searches.  Individuals do 
not expect to be able to enter a prison free from 
scrutiny.
When it comes to detention issues in a prison 
setting, individuals seeking to visit inmates fully 
expect to be subjected to the rigours of security 
processes which necessarily require a certain 
degree of restraint of liberty.   This reduced 
expectation of liberty is very real for all 
individuals wanting to visit anyone in a prison.  
There are secured barriers (doors and gates 
automatically lock after entrance), restricted 
admission (not being able to visit unless 
permission is granted), escorted travel (being 
under the direct and constant control of 
corrections officers), surrender of personal 
belongings (parting with most personal effects 
upon entering the building), and non-intrusive 
searches (metal detectors, x-ray machines and 
“When it comes to detention 
issues in a prison setting, 
individuals seeking to visit inmates 
fully expect to be subjected to the 
rigours of security processes 
which necessarily require a certain 
degree of restraint of liberty.  This 
reduced expectation of liberty is 
very real for all individuals wanting 
to visit anyone in a prison.” 
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Ionscan tests).   These restraints of liberty and 
investigative processes would not be expected 
and accepted with respect to almost all other 
dealings with state authorities.  [paras. 32-33]
In customs jurisprudence there are three 
categories of search; (1) routine questioning which 
every traveller undergoes at a port of entry, 
accompanied in some cases by a search of baggage 
and perhaps a pat or frisk of outer clothing (2) a 
strip or skin search conducted in a private room, 
after a secondary examination and 
with the permission of a customs 
officer in authority and (3) a body 
cavity search, in which customs 
officers have recourse to medical 
doctors, to X-rays, to emetics, 
and to other highly invasive 
means. Under the first category 
of search, no Charter issues arise. 
The trial judge used these categories, by analogy, to 
the prison setting. 
In this case, the questioning that occurred was 
simply a routine part of the general screening 
process for persons seeking entrance to a prison to 
visit an inmate. The referral to the visitor-risk 
assessment (similar to a secondary referral in a 
customs context) did not change the character or 
nature of the examination and it remained in the 
first category. Justice Chartier wrote:
When the detention factors are examined in the 
case at hand, such as the precise language used 
when requesting the accused to follow the 
corrections officers, that she was escorted to 
the interview room, that the interview room was 
locked, and that the questions were pointed, it 
would appear that, had the accused not been in a 
prison setting, constitutional detention principles 
may have been engaged. 
The accused, however, was not in the same 
situation as a pedestrian on the street stopped by 
police.   She voluntarily chose to place herself in 
the prison environment where there is a reduced 
expectation of liberty and privacy.   Parliament 
enacted legislation requiring each penitentiary to 
post “conspicuous” warning signs that persons are 
subject to search (s. 62).   It also authorized 
prison officials to conduct non-intrusive searches, 
which “must be limited to what is reasonably 
required for security purposes” (s. 59).   
The detention factors mentioned above have to be 
placed in the context of a prison setting, which is 
a secure facility and where temporary 
interruptions of an individual’s otherwise 
unencumbered liberty are not only expected but 
required.  The fact that she was escorted through 
locked doors from one place to another by 
corrections officers, subjected to non-intrusive 
searches and questioned for a brief period of 
time is predictable and necessary when one enters 
a prison.   
The accused’s knowledge and 
familiarity with respect to prison 
procedures is also an important 
contextual factor.   She knew, having 
visited the penitentiary on four prior 
occasions, that there would be scrutiny 
upon entering the premises.  There was 
even a sign posted at the main entrance 
that stated, “No visitors are obliged to 
submit to a search of their person, or 
personal belongings if they choose not to visit.”  
To say that she was taken by surprise by the 
procedures followed is simply implausible.
Another significant factor that was taken into 
account by the trial judge was the fact that the 
corrections officers would not have prevented 
the accused from leaving had she attempted to do 
so.   They also testified that had the accused 
refused to answer their questions they would have 
asked her to leave the penitentiary immediately 
without the benefit of a visit. … 
As long as the reason for the intervention by 
prison officials is limited to the valid purpose of 
preventing drugs and weapons from entering the 
prison, it will generally not attract constitutional 
obligations.  Questions regarding whether an 
individual is carrying drugs or weapons fall within 
that valid purpose. Until the intervention crosses 
from a preventative object (preventing drugs and 
weapons from entering the prison) into the realm 
of law enforcement (arrest and charge), Charter 
protection and concerns will generally not be 
engaged. 
I must comment on the corrections officers’ use 
of trickery, when they provided the accused with 
false information (that they knew that she was 
carrying drugs).  This is a law enforcement 
technique. It is used regularly by police 
authorities when investigating and solving crimes.  
Though it did not in this case, when combined and 
considered with other factors, it could have taken 
the intervention outside the legitimate object of 
“[A] prison setting ... is a 
secure facility and where 
temporary interruptions of an 
individual’s otherwise 
unencumbered liberty are not 
only expected but required.” 
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preventing drugs and weapons from entering the 
penitentiary. 
In the totality of the circumstances, I am of the 
view that the trial judge did not err when she 
found that the corrections officers’ intervention 
did not constitute an arbitrary detention contrary 
to s. 9 or one that was sufficient to engage a s. 
10(b) right to counsel. The visitor-risk assessment 
falls in the first category described in [customs 
jurisprudence] and, while it is a detention, it does 
not trigger constitutional protection. [paras. 46-
53]
The Court found the visitor-risk assessment 
undertaken by corrections officers was part of a 
routine administrative process and not a detention 
(psychologically or otherwise) in violation of the 
Charter. If the Court were to accept the argument 
she was psychologically detained, her subjective 
belief was not determinative of the issue. There is 
an objective component to the test—the belief must 
be a reasonable one, which in this case was not. She 
voluntarily attended a prison, where there is a 
reduced expectation of privacy and liberty, and she 
was aware she could be searched. 
Failure To Tell About Leaving
Finally, the Manitoba Court of Appeal rejected the 
accused’s argument that the corrections officers 
did not follow the provisions of s. 60(2) CCRA, by 
failing to advise her that she could leave the 
penitentiary once the Ionscan came back positive.  
She suggested that the corrections officers had, at 
that point, reasonable grounds to suspect that she 
was carrying drugs, so she should have been told 
explicitly that she could leave.  
Before there is a requirement that the corrections 
officers advise an individual that they may leave the 
institution, they must suspect on reasonable grounds 
that an individual has contraband and they must 
believe that a strip search is necessary to find the 
contraband.  In this case, Justice Chartier held, “the 
evidence shows that the corrections officers did not 
believe that a strip search was necessary until after 
the accused admitted to carrying drugs; not 
before.”   Therefore, s. 60(2) had not yet been 
triggered.
The accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ONLY ‘DESIGNATED’ OFFICER 
MAY GIVE DEMAND
R. v. Thibeault, 2007 NBCA 67
A customs officer working at a border 
crossing conducted a search of the 
accused’s motor vehicle. After finding 
an alcoholic beverage and detecting a 
smell of alcohol on his breath, the customs officer 
ordered the accused to provide a breath sample for 
screening by means of an ASD. The accused blew 
into the device four times before providing a 
suitable sample. A positive reading resulted. Breath 
samples for a breathalyzer analysis were demanded 
in order to determine the amount of alcohol in his 
blood and whether it exceeded the legal limit.  The 
local police force was called upon to obtain the 
required breath samples. Two breath samples were 
obtained and an analysis showed that the accused’s 
blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. A 
qualified technician’s certificate setting out the 
results of this analysis was admitted into evidence 
and was the sole item of proof showing that the 
accused’s blood alcohol level exceeded the legal 
limit. He was charged with over 80mg%.
 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
border officer testified he was a customs officer 
and, consequently, a “peace officer” for the 
purposes of the Criminal Code. He did not, however, 
claim to be a “designated” customs officer under 
s.163.4(1) of the Customs Act nor did Crown attempt 
to establish that he was. The trial judge found the 
border officer was a “peace officer” under s.254 of 
the Criminal Code even if he wasn’t a designated 
customs officer. The certificate of analysis was 
admissible and the accused was convicted. An appeal 
by the accused to the New Brunswick Court of 
Queen’s Bench was unsuccessful. 
The accused then appealed to the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal. In a unanimous judgment, the appeal 
court found the lower courts erred in their 
interpretation of the definition of a “peace officer” 
found in s.2 of the Criminal Code. 
A customs officer is a “peace officer” under the 
Criminal Code when performing any duty in the 
administration of the Customs Act. However, 
ss.163.4 and 163.5 of the Customs Act were added 
in 1998 to “confer upon ‘designated’ officers certain 
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duties and powers which the Customs Act did not 
attribute to regular officers.” Justice Drapeau 
stated:
[Section] 163.5(2) provides that an officer 
designated under s. 163.4(1) has, in performing 
the normal duties of a customs officer at a 
customs office, the powers of a “peace officer” 
under section 254 of the Criminal Code. 
Section 163.5(2) also provides that a 
designated officer “may, on demanding samples 
of a person’s […]   breath under subsection 
254(3) [of the Criminal Code], require that the 
person accompany the officer, or a peace 
officer referred to in paragraph (c) of the 
definition of “peace officer” in section 2 of 
[the Criminal Code], for the purpose of taking 
the samples”.
If customs officers who have not been 
designated under s. 163.4 had the powers of a 
“peace officer” under s. 254 to demand that a 
person provide breath samples for screening 
purposes, s. 163.5(2) of the Customs Act would 
be completely redundant. [paras. 17-18]
A certificate of analysis is admissible if the Crown 
establishes that the breath samples were provided 
pursuant to a valid demand under s.254(3) made by a 
“peace officer” upon reasonable and probable 
grounds. And only “designated” customs officers are 
“peace officers” for the purpose of s.254 having the 
power to make such a demand. This also applies to 
both ASD and breathalyzer demands under s.254(2). 
Since the Crown did not establish that the customs 
officer was a “designated” officer, the accused’s 
breath samples were not provided pursuant to a valid 
demand. The Court of Appeal found the officer’s 
statement he was a customs officer did not 
presumptively make him a peace officer for the 
purpose of giving breath demands. The certificate 
of analysis was inadmissible. The accused’s appeal 
was allowed and an acquittal entered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
FORMAL INTERVIEW NOT 
NECESSARILY DETENTION
R. v. Lee, 2007 ABCA 337
The accused was interviewed by police 
as follow up to a drug investigation. 
Her son and his girlfriend were 
allegedly part of a drug conspiracy and 
wiretaps of private communications indicated that 
the girlfriend discussed turning money over to the 
accused. The police had some circumstantial 
evidence that she did receive the money and turned 
it over to her son. The investigating officer did not 
believe he had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused but wanted to find out about her 
involvement with the money and was hoping for 
self-incriminatory evidence. The investigator 
contacted the accused and left her with the 
impression that he wished to interview her about her 
son’s charges and he proposed that they meet at a 
police station. She decided to meet him at police 
headquarters.
 
The accused arrived at the police station with her 
husband. She voluntarily went into the secure area 
of the building without her husband, to a small 
“hard” interview room equipped for video recording, 
but she was not told the conversation would be 
videotaped. The investigator told her about the 
wiretaps which indicated that she had handled the 
money and that was the reason she was there, thus 
ending the pretext of discussing her son’s case. 
There was general discussion about irrelevant family 
and background details and the investigator advised 
her about her right to remain silent and that 
anything she said could be used in evidence. At no 
time during the interview was she told she could, or 
could not, leave.
 
The investigator asked her if she wished to discuss 
the wiretapped phone calls. She replied, “Ask it. I’ll 
decide whether I want to.” The officer replied, 
“That sounds fair.” The accused asserted that she 
had “nothing to hide”. The interview was steered 
back to the cash, but the accused did not answer 
directly. When asked if she had received the money 
from her son’s girlfriend, she replied, “I’m not going 
to sit here and incriminate myself.” The officer 
persevered with questions and conversation and the 
accused eventually indirectly acknowledged 
BY THE BOOK:
Peace Officer
“Peace officer” under s.2 of the 
Criminal Code includes “an officer 
within the meaning of the Customs Act 
... when performing any duty in the 
administration of any of those Acts.”
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receiving the money. She was told that the money 
was likely the proceeds of crime and what occurred 
was technically a breach of the law, but that the 
investigator was not sure if charging her was 
appropriate and said that he wanted input from the 
Crown. It was after that point where the accused 
spoke the most on topic but even that ended quickly. 
So did the conversation which concluded with 
discussion of getting a lawyer involved.
 
After the police interview, the investigator thanked 
the accused for coming in, asked her if she had any 
questions, gave her his card, and then escorted her 
back to the public area of the building and she left 
with her husband.
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused was convicted of possessing proceeds of 
crime under s.355(a) of the Criminal Code. She 
testified she felt she was under compulsion during 
the interview, and argued she was detained and her 
right to counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter was 
violated. In her view, her statement to police was 
inadmissible under s.24(2). The trial judge, however, 
found the accused was not detained. He considered 
a number of factors in deciding whether she was 
detained or not. The trial judge found that she came 
voluntarily to the police station in response to a 
request, not a demand, because she expected to find 
out information about her son—she was a free 
participant. 
Even though she did not know the interview would be 
videotaped, her lack of awareness was irrelevant to 
subjective detention. It had nothing to do with 
whether she thought she was detained. Further, 
advising the accused about her right to silence and 
that anything she said could be used as evidence 
“dispelled any doubts that this was an informal 
chitchat, and made it clear 
that this was a business 
meeting”. The questions were 
general, open-ended and non-
confrontational. The accused 
was not confronted with 
accusations of guilt and told to 
explain her innocence. The 
police did not have reasonable 
grounds to charge her before, 
or after, the interview. She 
was more than a mere witness but the investigator 
had no fixed mind set. The police were not 
oppressive or domineering and the accused came and 
left by her own means. Finally, the trial judge 
rejected her suggestion that she felt compelled to 
answer because she was in a secure area, in a small 
room, far from the entrance, with the door closed.
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in 
finding there was no detention. She suggested that 
the trial judge found she should have asked to be let 
go and have her request refused before she could be 
considered detained. In rejecting this argument, the 
Court noted that the trial judge merely took into 
account that there was no indication she could not 
leave when assessing her claim she was 
psychologically detained. Further, the Court said:  
Presently, the law does not command the police 
to tell every interview subject before 
questioning that such person has the right to 
leave their presence. Even if it might be wise for 
the police to do so in some instances, failure to 
do so does not violate an established general 
legal obligation of the police towards interview 
subjects. [The investigator] did not need the 
informed consent of this [accused] to remain 
with him to avoid the interview being 
characterized as detention. We are not 
persuaded that the mere fact that the 
[accused] was being formally interviewed by a 
police officer - who told her she was suspected 
of an offence - itself constitutes detention 
without regard to the factors considered in 
Moran. No authority for this proposition was 
given to us. [para. 25]
The fact the accused said she did not plan to sit in 
the interview and incriminate herself and that she 
would decide whether she 
would answer the questions 
was also relevant to her 
submissive state of mind. Her 
ability to chose was not 
“sapped” by police and 
replaced by a reasonable 
belief her liberty was being 
restrained under police 
power. Nor did the fact police 
regarded her as a suspect and 
“[T]he law does not command the police 
to tell every interview subject before 
questioning that such person has the right 
to leave their presence. Even if it might 
be wise for the police to do so in some 
instances, failure to do so does not 
violate an established general legal 
obligation of the police towards interview 
subjects.”
www.10-8.ca20
Volume 7 Issue 6
November/December 2007
had a motive to acquire evidence from her render 
the encounter a detention:
…The fourth and fifth criteria in Moran refer 
to the “stage of the investigation” and “whether 
the police had reasonable and probable 
grounds”. …[T]he first factor in Moran, 
referring to the basis on which she was asked to 
attend at police headquarters, did not bespeak 
detention, nor did the second, since the 
[accused] came by her own means with her 
husband, nor did the third, since she left 
afterwards the same way.
The trial judge was also entitled to find it 
relevant that even if the police surprised the 
[accused] with advice about her potential legal 
jeopardy and with advisement about her right to 
silence, what followed was a polite and non-
threatening discussion in which she expressed 
and effectively exercised her rights.
 
The [accused] would have us virtually abandon 
the balancing multi-factorial test in Moran and 
adopt instead a fixed rule to the effect that if 
a person being interviewed is believed by the 
police to be guilty, and if the police are close to 
reasonable and probable grounds, and if the 
police are seeking to gather self-incriminatory 
evidence, then the interview amounts to a legal 
detention, regardless of the Moran factors. As 
noted above, no authority for this new rule was 
provided to us….[paras. 30-32]
 
The trial judge properly weighed the evidence, 
including the videotape, and found the accused was 
neither objectively nor subjectively detained. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Detention Factors 
In R. v. Moran (1987), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 
225 (Ont.C.A.) the Ontario Court of 
Appeal made reference to a non-
exhaustive list of considerations relevant 
to whether or not a detention has taken 
place. These factors have been considered and referred 
to by many appellate courts across Canada. Here they 
are: 
1. The precise language used by the police officer 
in requesting the person who subsequently 
becomes an accused to come to the police 
station, and whether the accused was given a 
choice or expressed a preference that the 
interview be conducted at the police station, 
rather than at his or her home;
2. Whether the accused was escorted to the police 
station by a police officer or came himself or 
herself in response to a police request;
3. Whether the accused left at the conclusion of 
the interview or whether he or she was arrested; 
4. The stage of the investigation, that is, whether 
the questioning was part of the general 
investigation of a crime or possible crime or 
whether the police had already decided that a 
crime had been committed and that the accused 
was the perpetrator or involved in its commission 
and the questioning was conducted for the 
purpose of obtaining incriminating statements 
from the accused;
5. Whether the police had reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that the accused had 
committed the crime being investigated;
 
6. The nature of the questions: whether they were 
questions of a general nature designed to obtain 
information or whether the accused was 
confronted with evidence pointing to his or her 
guilt; 
7. The subjective belief by an accused that he or 
she is detained, although relevant, is not 
decisive, because the issue is whether he or she 
reasonably believed that he or she was detained. 
Personal circumstances relating to the accused, 
such as low intelligence, emotional disturbance, 
youth and lack of sophistication are 
circumstances to be considered in determining 
whether he had a subjective belief that he was 
detained.
It must be remembered though, that no single factor or 
combination of factors, or an absence of any of these is 
necessarily determinative of the issue. 
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BRITISH COLUMBIA: CANADA’s 
MOST EXPLOSIVE PROVINCE
According to data recently 
released by the Canadian Data 
Centre, Canada had a total of 
194 explosive incidents in 2006. 
British Columbia ranked first 
among incidents, bombings, 
attempted bombings, improvised 
explosive device recoveries, explosive thefts, and 
explosives recoveries. 
The following definitions will help explain the 
incidents reported in the table below.
Incidents – The number of times Explosives Disposal 
Units were called to scenes involving the possible use 
of explosives.
Bombings – Explosions of devices created for non-
authorized or criminal use that occurred at incidents 
attended by Explosives Disposal Units.
Province / 
Territory










British Columbia 75 11 5 6 22 2 29
Alberta 16 - - 1 2 - 13
Saskatchewan 3 1 - 1 1 - -
Manitoba 3 - - 1 - - 2
Ontario 28 3 1 7 7 - 9
Quebec 34 4 1 7 8 - 14
New Brunswick 6 1 1 - 2 - 2
Nova Scotia 29 - - 8 1 - 20
Prince Edward Island - - - - - - -
Newfoundland - - - - - - -
North West Territories - - - - - - -
Yukon - - - - - - -
Nunavut - - - - - - -
Canada 194 20 8 31 43 2 89
Attempted Bombings – Incidents attended by 
Explosives Disposal Units involving the use of one or 
more improvised explosive devices that failed to 
function because of an unintentional defect in design or 
assembly. 
Hoax Devices – Incidents attended by Explosives 
Disposal Units where devices constructed from inert or 
non-explosive components were intended to resemble 
actual bombs.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) – A bomb created 
for non-authorized use.
Recovered IEDs – Number of IEDs, that were 
recovered by Explosives Disposal Units. At one incident, 
one or more IEDs can be recovered. 
Explosive Thefts – Incidents attended by Explosives 
Disposal Units that involved reporting stolen explosives 
materials, the flammable component bombs.
Explosive Recoveries – Incidents where Explosives 
Disposal Units recovered explosive materials that were 
armed, dumped, stolen or suspected to be connected 
with unlawful activities.
Source: Canadian Bomb Data Centre available at www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/techops/cbdc/crim_use_expl_e.htm (accessed October 31, 2007).
www.10-8.ca22
Volume 7 Issue 6
November/December 2007
federal, provincial/territorial, municipal, and First 
Nations. In terms of percentages, municipal policing 
accounted for 66% of the officers, provincial 
policing 25%, federal policing 6% and other (such as 
the RCMP HQ and Training Academy) 3%. 
POLICING NUMBERS ACROSS 
THE NATION
According to a 2007 report 
released by Statistics Canada 
there were 64,134 police officers 
across Canada last year, up 1,673 
(2.7%) from the previous year. Ontario had the 
most officers (23,759) while the Yukon had the 
least (116) (see map below for all provincial/
territorial numbers). 
With a population of 
32,852,800, Canada’s 
average  cop per pop 
ratio was 195 police 
officers per 100,000 
residents.
The report included all 

























In 2006, the total expenditures on policing was $9,877,071,000
Canada’s Largest Municipal Police Services 2007
Service Officers % Female
Toronto, ON 5,558 16%
Montreal, QU 4,406 28%
Peel Regional, ON 1,686 15%
Calgary, AB 1,604 14%
Edmonton, AB 1,364 16%
Vancouver, BC 1,309 20%
Winnipeg, MN 1,275 16%
York Regional, ON 1,260 16%
Ottawa, ON 1,210 21%
Source: Statistics Canada, 2007, 
Police Resources in Canada, 
Catalogue No:85-225-XIE
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Gender
There were 11,853 female officers accounting for 
18.5% overall. British Columbia had the greatest 
percentage of female officers (22%) while Nunavut 
had the lowest (11%). Female 
officers accounted for 7% of 
senior officers, 12% of non-
commissioned officers, and 21% 
of constables. 
RCMP
The RCMP had the largest presence 
in British Columbia with 5,743 
officers, followed by Alberta 





R. v. Tran, 2007 BCCA 491
Police were conducting surveillance of 
a habitual drug-user.  When not in jail, 
he was known to support his ongoing 
addiction through daily crimes of 
breaking and entering homes and theft of 
automobiles.   The police received information from 
his relative that he had recently been released from 
jail and was engaging in drug use and property 
crimes.  The police watched him and another person 
go from house to house in a residential 
neighbourhood, carrying a crowbar obtained that 
morning from a hardware store. The police saw them 
attempt to break into a house, but they apparently 
became aware of the surveillance and fled back to 
the drug-user’s relative’s residence from which they 
had come.  
A few minutes later, the police saw the drug user 
come into the lane behind the house.  A vehicle pulled 
up, the user got in, and knelt on the front passenger 
seat.  A police officer could see that the user was in 
close proximity to the driver (the accused).  She 
could see his upper body but not his hands. After 
about 15 seconds, the user got out of the car and it 
drove away. The police followed the vehicle, stopped 
it, and arrested the accused for trafficking in a 
controlled substance. The vehicle was searched and 
a black pouch containing 11 flaps of cocaine (totaling 
3.7 grams) and 19 flaps of heroin (totaling 3.8 grams) 
was located in a pocket or compartment on the 
driver’s side door. The officer also recovered a can 
of dog repellent from the same compartment. The 
accused was searched and $136 cash and a cell phone 
which rang constantly (but was not answered by the 
police) was found. Meanwhile, another surveillance 
team member chased two other men into the 
residence, where he found and arrested the user and 
recovered one package believed to contain drugs. 
At trial in the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
the accused argued his right to be secure from 
unreasonable search and seizure under s.8 of the 
Charter was breached. In his view, the officer did 
not objectively have reasonable grounds to make the 
Canada’s Largest Municipal RCMP Detachments 2007
Service Officers % Female
Surrey, BC 477 22%
Richmond, BC 306 26%
Burnaby, BC 228 28%
Kelowna, BC 143 26%
Prince George, BC 128 21%
Langley Township, BC 126 30%
Coquitlam, BC 123 28%
Nanaimo, BC 121 23%
Kamloops, BC 111 27%
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arrest and therefore the search that followed was 
unreasonable. The trial judge disagreed, holding that 
the officer’s observations combined with her 
knowledge of the user were sufficient to provide 
reasonable grounds that the driver of the car had 
drugs. The officer testified that she had reasonable 
grounds, which included the user’s background as a 
drug addict known to support his habit through 
property crime, his suspicious behaviour during the 
surveillance, his actions in kneeling down inside the 
vehicle in a very brief meeting, and his body language 
while in the vehicle. The accused was convicted of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking 
and possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking.  
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal submitting his rights under ss.8 and 
9 of the Charter were breached. He again contended 
that the police, although perhaps having sufficient 
grounds to detain, did not have objective reasonable 
grounds for the arrest and therefore the searches 
that followed were not valid as an incident to arrest. 
Further, he argued that the experience of the 
officer was not relevant to the assessment as to 
whether objective reasonable grounds existed. In 
his view, the test for reasonableness is what a 
reasonable lay person would conclude in the 
circumstances. 
Justice Lavine, giving the opinion of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, confirmed that a search 
incident to arrest will be valid if the arrest is valid. 
An arrest will be valid if the officer has reasonable 
grounds upon which to base it. This includes both a 
subjective and objective component. Subjectively 
the officer must believe they have reasonable 
grounds and those grounds must be objectively 
reasonable. As well, “the objective reasonableness 
of the arresting officer’s grounds must be assessed 
from the standpoint of  the reasonable person 
‘standing in the shoes of the police officer’”, not 
through the lens of a lay person. 
In this case there was no dispute the arresting 
officer subjectively had reasonable grounds. As for 
the objective grounds the officer did not see an 
actual exchange between the user and the accused. 
However, looking at the “entire picture”, objective 
grounds did exist. The officer had ten years of 
experience, including five years on the property 
crime surveillance team. She had seen in excess of 
100 drug transactions and testified the encounter 
between the user and the accused fit the pattern of 
a “dial-a-dope” transaction. The trial judge properly 
considered the following factors to infer that the 
encounter in the vehicle was a drug transaction:
• The knowledge of the user’s drug addiction, and 
his penchant for property crimes to support his 
habit;
• The information from the user’s relative that he 
had been released from jail and was using drugs 
and committing crimes;
• The observations of the user “casing the 
neighbourhood” and attempting to break and 
enter into a residence;
• The encounter between the user and the 
accused in the vehicle, which the officer 
believed, based on her experience, was 
consistent with a “dial-a-dope” transaction.
The test for determining reasonable grounds is not 
to view each item of evidence separately, but to view 
them cumulatively using the “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and the 
conviction upheld.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Right to Silence
“[The individual’s right to remain silent] does 
not mean, however, that a person has the 
right not to be spoken to by state 
authorities.  The importance of police 
questioning in the fulfillment of their 
investigative role cannot be doubted.  One can readily 
appreciate that the police could hardly investigate crime 
without putting questions to persons from whom it is thought 
that useful information may be obtained. The person 
suspected of having committed the crime being investigated 
is no exception. Indeed, if the suspect in fact committed the 
crime, he or she is likely the person who has the most 
information to offer about the incident.   Therefore, the 
common law also recognizes the importance of police 
interrogation in the investigation of crime.” - Supreme Court of 
Canada Justice Charron, R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC
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COMPARING CRIME:
CANUCKS v. YANKEES 
Have you ever considered how  
the crime rate in Canada 
compares to that of the United 
States? Three crime rates—
homicide, break and enter, and 
motor vehicle theft—were 
chosen for comparison. All US statistics were 
obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
“Crime in the United States, 2006” report while 
Canadian statistics were obtained from Statistics 
Canada’s “Juristat: Canadian Crime Statistics, 2006, 
Vol. 27, no. 5”. 
Murder/Homicide 
The US murder rate was 5.9 “per 100,000 
inhabitants.” In Canada, the homicide rate “per 
100,000 population” was 1.9. 
The District of Columbia had the highest murder 
rate at 29.1 per 100,000, followed by Louisiana 
(12.4), Maryland (9.7) and Nevada (9.0). Canada’s top 
homicide rate was Nunavut at 6.5, followed by 
Saskatchewan (4.1), Manitoba (3.3) and Alberta 
(2.8). 
Motor Vehicle Theft
The US motor vehicle theft rate was 398 per 
100,000 inhabitants, while in Canada that rate 
increases to 487. The jurisdiction with the highest 
motor vehicle theft rate was Manitoba at 1,376, 
followed by District of Columbia (1,259), Nevada 
(1,080), North West Territories (927), Arizona 
(890), Alberta (725), Washington (718), British 
Columbia (682), California (666) and Saskatchewan 
(633).
Burglary/Break & Enter 
In the US, the crime of 
break and enter is known as 
burglary. Burglary is 
defined as the unlawful 
entry of a structure to 
commit a felony or theft.  
To classify an offense as a 
burglary, using force to 
gain entry need not occur. 
The US rate was 729 
burglaries per 100,000 
inhabitants. In Canada, the 
average break and enter 
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“Think globally. Act locally.” - author unknown
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MENTAL CONDITIONING
Insp. Kelly Keith, Atlantic Police Academy
Have you ever been running or cycling and talked 
yourself into being tired?  In any sport or training 
atmosphere, your mind can be your biggest asset or 
your worst enemy.  How you think and what you think 
about can and will affect the way you feel during 
your exercise.  In fact there is no doubt that what 
you think about can make the difference between 
winning or losing, enjoying or hating your training, 
and have a big impact on your decision to stay with 
an exercise program.
You can use either the association or disassociation 
technique. When you use the association technique 
you are focusing on body sensations and monitoring 
any changes. When you are using the dissociation 
technique you direct your attention away from bodily  
sensations.  So which is best?  
Many endurance athletes tend to favour dissociation 
during training and association during competition.  
Dissociation can reduce the sense of effort, fatigue, 
and pain while training. However, association is 
generally believed to be linked to faster competition 
times.  By being aware of the two techniques you can 
use them to compliment a longer endurance workout.  
When you start feeling tired or sluggish dissociate 
from these feelings and concentrate on what you are 
doing and finishing harder. You can always come back 
into the association technique when these feelings 
pass.  I believe it is best to try using the association 
technique as much as possible.  In fact, if you can 
visualize an opponent or visualize your baton swings, 
hand strikes, kicks, etc. along with the association 
technique, your training will reach an entirely new 
level.  
I re-call a war story that I tell most of my classes.  
I was in full police uniform at bar closing speaking 
with the manager when approximately 35 feet in 
front of me I saw two males approaching each other.  
There was no doubt that these two were going to 
fight.  I started making my way through the crowd 
but before I could make it (all of 15 seconds) they 
clashed.  Male # 1 went to grab male # 2 at which 
point male # 2 absolutely exploded with fists that 
were faster than I have ever seen fists fly. And I've 
been around the fight game for a long time.  Male # 
1 fell to the ground unconscious.  After I had settled 
this call which was easy because neither wanted 
anything to do with me, and time allowed, I took the 
time to visualize the "what if" I had been male # 1 
and the fists started coming at me that fast.  It is a 
fact that we do not want to be in the "inside 
position" of any suspect, however reality shows us 
that it does happen on occasion.  So to this day in "my 
mind" I have been in this situation many times and 
come out successful which is a critical component of 
success.  Should it happen to me I will default to 
what was successful, drop down and do a double leg 
takedown rather than trying to evade, block or move 
off the line of attack from fists that were 
unbelievably fast!
Athletes use visualization, focus and other mental 
conditioning exercises to be successful.  When 
visualizing, it is important that you visualize a skill at 
normal speed. If you continually visualize a skill at 
slower speeds it can be a detriment rather than a 
benefit. When the skill turns to real time your brain 
may be better at executing the action, however it is 
conditioned to deal with the skill at a slower speed 
and thus will not react in real time speed. Visualize in 
a quiet spot and visualize yourself doing the skill in  
various states of fatigue. Visualize yourself being 
successful in lifting the required amount of weight 
that you are attempting to lift. With control tactics, 
visualization is a powerful tool that will increase 
confidence, decrease re-action time, and, when 
needed, your body will feel like you have been there 
done that! Visualization needs to be in your "tool-
box" of control tactics and exercises.
Most people have pictures of their partners or 
families on the inside of their lockers.  I recall a cop 
who had his locker beside mine. He had a picture of 
a thug on the inside of his locker. Of course I had to 
ask why he had the picture. His answer was awesome!  
This thug had assaulted him. The reason my fellow 
officer believed he had won this confrontation was 
due to his hard workouts.  Before he went out for his 
workout he took a look at the picture to remind him 
why he should give 100% effort in his workout 
before shift. 
Another great way to bring yourself into the right 
mental state is to have a task relevant cue-word if 
you find your mental state getting off track. My 
favourite is "go-time", which in my mind puts me back 
in the state that I need to be. A great method I 
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believe should be added to our tool-box of tricks to 
ensure that we go home at the end of every shift.
When the going gets tough some people quit, others 
fight harder. What better way to train mental 
toughness than pushing yourself to the limit while 
working out and then pushing yourself a little bit 
further. With good physical conditioning and skill on 
your side it is easier to have a winning mind set. 
Mental fitness is about performance enhancement! 
About the Author - Insp. Kelly Keith is a 20 year 
veteran of law enforcement and presently teaches  
at the Atlantic Police Academy. Kelly is a second 
degree black belt in Jiu-Jitsu and a Certified 
Personal Trainer, Strength and Conditioning 
Instructor, and a Certified Sports Nutrition 
Specialist. He can be reached by email at 
KKeith@pei.sympatico.ca 
FORMER SUPREME COURT CHIEF 
JUSTICE DIES
The Right Honourable Antonio 
Lamer, formerly a justice and 
Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, passed away in 
Ottawa on November 24, 2007 
after a prolonged illness. Born in 
Montreal, Quebec, Chief Justice 
Lamer served in the Royal Canadian Artillery and in 
the Canadian Intelligence Corps. In 1956, he 
graduated in law from the Université de Montréal. 
He was appointed to the Quebec Superior Court in 
1969, the Quebec Court of Appeal in 1978 and the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1980. In 1990 he was 
named the 16th Chief Justice of Canada, retiring in 
2000.
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, on behalf of the 
members of the Supreme Court of Canada, mourned 
Chief Justice Lamer's passing. "Antonio Lamer was 
an eminent jurist, and a fierce defender of the 
independence of the judiciary. He served as a justice 
of the Supreme Court of Canada and as Chief Justice 
of Canada during an important period of Canadian 
history. He was a forceful advocate for the rights 
enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. His decisions left an indelible mark on 
both the law and Canadian society. His presence and 
passion for the law will be sorely missed.” 
CONFESSIONS RULE & RIGHT 
TO SILENCE INQUIRY 
FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT
R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48
The accused was arrested for second 
degree murder after an innocent 
bystander was killed  by a stray bullet 
while standing inside the door of a pub.  
There had been an argument between a group of men 
and pub staff and a shot was fired at a pub employee 
standing outside the pub, but struck the bystander. 
No weapon was recovered and there was no forensic 
evidence. However, surveillance video inside the pub 
caught the initial argument on tape along with the 
men walking towards the exit doors. A police officer 
also took surveillance photographs of the accused at 
another pub the following day and subsequently 
identified him as one of the men in the video from 
the pub shooting. As well, the intended victim of the 
shooting identified the accused as the shooter.
The accused was interviewed twice by police 
following his arrest. Both interviews were video and 
audio taped. The first interview in the evening lasted 
70 minutes while a second interview the following 
morning lasted 47 minutes. Before the first 
interview the accused was given a Charter warning 
and spoke to a lawyer twice; once by telephone and 
again in a meeting. During the first interview the 
accused tried to end the interview 18 times by saying 
he did not want to talk about the incident or didn’t 
know anything about the incident and by asking to be 
returned to his cell. Each time the investigator 
continued to talk, outlining what the police knew 
about the shooting and inviting comment. The 
accused did not confess to the crime, but made 
incriminating statements, admitting he had been to 
the pub and identifying himself as one of the persons 
seen in the pub video. The accused did not confess 
to the crime and the interview ended shortly 
afterwards. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused argued the statements he made to police 
were involuntary and violated his right to remain 
silent under s.7 of the Charter. Although the tactics 
of the investigator caused him some concern, the 
trial judge admitted edited versions of the 
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statements. In his view, the accused’s right to talk 
or to remain silent was not undermined or overborne 
by the investigator’s admitted dedication to put part 
of the police case against the accused in an effort to 
get him to confess. The accused’s admission that he 
was the person in the video was freely made and did 
not result from the police breaking down his desire 
to maintain his silence. As the trial judge noted, the 
investigator’s persuasion did not deny the accused 
the right to choose to speak to police or deprive him 
of an operating mind. The Crown tendered only the 
first statement made to police to the jury and the 
accused was convicted of second degree murder. 
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing that once a detainee states 
he does not want to make a statement he has 
exercised his right to remain silent under s.7 of the 
Charter and any further police conduct, like 
persistent questioning, violates that right. In his 
view, once he asserted his right to silence the police 
must stop their efforts in getting an admission. 
Furthermore, he submitted that the strategy 
employed by the investigator denied him the choice 
to remain silent. 
Justice Mackenzie, writing the opinion of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, first found that “the 
police are not precluded from using reasonable 
persuasion to encourage a detained person to break 
his silence after his right to silence has been 
asserted following the exercise of the right to 
counsel.” In this case, “the officer used a 
sophisticated technique of persuasion but the 
[accused] knew he was talking to a police officer and 
he was not under any misapprehension of his 
position.” This is different than a situation where 
the police introduce an undercover police officer 
into a cell in the guise of a fellow prisoner to trick 
the detainee into thinking he was talking to another 
prisoner and not the police. This was an investigative 
interview where the accused was aware he was in the 
presence of a police officer. As for the “stratagem” 
employed by the investigator, he was trying to 
persuade the accused to talk despite his resistance 
for the most part. His right to choose was not 
overborne. The Court also ruled there was no utility 
in a double-barrelled test for admissibility. In other 
words, there was no need to analyze both the 
common law confessions rule and the right to silence 
when determining whether a statement was 
admissible.  
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Although he conceded his statements were 
voluntary (obtained in conformity with the common 
law confessions rule), he contended, among other 
arguments, that the police breached his s.7 Charter 
right to silence by not refraining from questioning 
him when he stated he did not want to speak to 
police. He suggested that if the police were to 
proceed as they did, they would need a signed waiver. 
In other words, once a detainee asserts the right to 
silence, the police have a correlative duty to stop 
questioning them. 
In a 5:4 judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada 
dismissed the accused’s appeal. Justice Charron, 
authoring the majority judgment,  concluded that 
the right to silence under s.7 and the common law 
confessions rule are so closely related that “where a 
statement has survived a thorough inquiry into 
voluntariness, the accused’s Charter application 
alleging that the statement was obtained in violation 
of the pre-trial right to silence under s. 7 cannot 
succeed”. And further, “if circumstances are such 
that the accused can show on a balance of 
probabilities that the statement was obtained in 
violation of his or her constitutional right to remain 
silent, the Crown will be unable to prove 
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Interplay Between Confessions Rule & 
Right to Silence
The common law confessions rule requires the Crown 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a statement 
made to a person in authority was voluntary before 
it is admitted. For if a statement is not voluntary, it 
could be false. Thus, the primary reason for the 
confessions rule is the concern with the reliability of 
the confession. The rule counters the dangers 
created by improper interrogation techniques that 
could produce a false confession. This is very 
important because a confession can, in and of itself, 
ground a conviction. 
Voluntariness includes an individual’s freedom to 
choose whether to give information to the police or 
answer questions, or not. This applies to suspects 
whether or not they are in detention. However, after 
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detention the detainee is more vulnerable, they 
cannot simply walk away but are instead under 
control of the police. Detention can have a 
significant impact on the detainee and cause them to 
feel compelled to give a statement. A police caution 
about providing a statement informs the suspect of 
their right to remain silent and can be an important 
factor in determining voluntariness. 
In assessing whether a statement 
was voluntary, a court will 
consider all of the circumstances 
including the following factors; 
threats or promises, oppression, 
operating mind, or police trickery. 
Thus, the question of 
voluntariness focuses on the 
conduct of the police and its 
effect on the suspect’s ability to 
exercise their free will. The test 
is objective, but the individual 
characteristics of an accused will 
be relevant. In holding that the 
test for voluntariness at common 
law concerning a statement made 
by a person under detention and the Charter right to 
silence are functionally equivalent, Justice Charron 
stated:
[V]oluntariness, as it is understood today, 
requires that the court scrutinize whether the 
accused was denied his or her right to silence.  
The right to silence is defined in accordance 
with constitutional principles.   A finding of 
voluntariness will therefore be determinative 
of the s. 7 issue.  In other words, if the Crown 
proves voluntariness beyond a reasonable 
doubt, there can be no finding of a Charter 
violation of the right to silence in respect of 
the same statement.  The converse holds true 
as well. If the circumstances are such that an 
accused is able to show on a balance of 
probabilities  a breach of his or her right to 
silence, the Crown will not be in a position to 
meet the voluntariness test.  [para. 37]
The majority was careful to point out that the 
confessions rule does not always subsume the 
constitutional right to silence. For example, a cell 
plant (undercover police officer or agent) actively 
eliciting a statement from a detainee can breach s.7 
yet the common law confessions rule would not apply 
because the statement was not made to a person 
perceived to be in authority.  
As for the constitutional right to silence protected 
under s.7 of the Charter, there is a balance to be 
struck between an individual’s freedom of choice and 
the state’ s interest in the effective investigation of 
crime. A suspect may be the most fruitful source of 
information and the police 
may attempt to tap this 
source provided they do not 
deprive them of their right to 
chose to talk to the 
authorities. In achieving this 
balance, the police are not 
prohibited from questioning 
an accused. “Police 
persuasion, short of denying 
the suspect the right to 
choose or depriving him of an 
operating mind, does not 
breach the right to silence.” 
In this case, the trial judge 
reviewed all of the relevant 
circumstances and concluded the accused’s right to 
choose to talk, or remain silent, was not undermined 
or overborne by the interrogator. Although “the 
number of times an accused asserts his or her right 
to silence is part of the assessment of all of the 
circumstances” it is not in itself determinative of 
the issue. The test is whether the accused exercised 
free will by choosing to make a statement. 
A Different View
The minority found that the accused’s statements 
were obtained in breach of his s.7 right to silence 
and collaterally of his right to counsel, by being told 
to forsake his counsel’s advice. “Detainees left alone 
to face interrogators who persistently ignore their 
assertions of the right to silence and their pleas for 
respite are bound to feel that their constitutional 
right to silence has no practical effect and that they 
in fact have no choice but to answer,” said Justice 
Fish. In the minority’s view the statements should 
have been excluded under s.24(2), the appeal 
allowed, and a new trial ordered. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
 
“A finding of voluntariness will therefore 
be determinative of the s. 7 issue.  In 
other words, if the Crown proves 
voluntariness beyond a reasonable 
doubt, there can be no finding of a 
Charter violation of the right to silence 
in respect of the same statement.  The 
converse holds true as well. If the 
circumstances are such that an 
accused is able to show on a balance of 
probabilities a breach of his or her right 
to silence, the Crown will not be in a 
position to meet the voluntariness test.”
www.10-8.ca30
Volume 7 Issue 6
November/December 2007
RIGHT TO SILENCE & CONFESSIONS RULE GRID
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HOMICIDE BY THE NUMBERS
According to a recently released 
Statistics Canada report, 
“Homicide in Canada, 2006”, 
there were 58 fewer homicides 
last year than the year before 
(2005). This accounts for a 10% decrease in 
homicides. All provinces reported a decrease with 
the exception of British Columbia and Prince Edward 
Island. BC’s homicide rate rose by almost 6% last 
year while PEI had one homicide, up from none the 
year previous. Ontario had the most homicides with 
196 while both the Yukon and the North West 
Territories had none. Seventeen percent, about one 
in six homicides, were gang related. 
Methods
The most popular method used to commit homicide 
was the knife, followed by the gun. Other methods 
included beating, strangulation/suffocation, fire, 
poisoning, shaken baby syndrome, vehicle, and 
unknown causes. 
Guns
Of the 190 homicides involving firearms, the weapon 
of choice was a handgun. 
Homicides by Province/Territory
Area Homicides Homicide Rate







Nova Scotia 16 1.71
New Brunswick 7 0.93
Prince Edward Island 1 0.72
Yukon 0 0.00
























Unknown Type 18 9.5%
Source: Statistics Canada, 2007, “Homicide in Canada, 2006”, 
catalogue no. 85-002-XIE, Vol. 27, no.8
Homicide by Province
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GARBAGE SEARCH OK
R. v. Patrick, 2007 ABCA 308
The police suspected that the accused 
was operating an ecstasy lab in his 
home . On six occasions they conducted 
a search of his garbage, which involved 
seizing opaque garbage bags located inside garbage 
cans that were placed in the receptacle at the back 
of his property. The bags were readily accessible to 
the public, since the garbage cans had no lids and the 
receptacle did not have any doors to cover the 
opening into the alleyway. Nonetheless, the officers 
did have to reach over the property line in order to 
retrieve the garbage bags. The police identified 
items within at least four of the bags that were 
indicative of an ecstasy lab. These items, along with 
other information garnered from their investigation, 
were used to obtain a search warrant for the 
accused’s residence.
The search warrant was executed by officers 
wearing protective suits due to the risk of explosion, 
fire, or chemical contamination from using certain 
chemicals in the manufacture of ecstasy. 
The police officer in possession of the 
warrant remained outside until he was 
advised that the home was secure and that 
it was safe to enter. He then entered the 
residence and assisted in placing the 
accused under arrest. The officer then 
placed the accused into a police car 
outside the residence, re-entered the 
residence, and placed the warrant on the 
kitchen table. He did not show the warrant 
to the accused at any time. 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the 
accused argued that his rights under s.8 of the 
Charter were violated because the police searched 
his garbage without a warrant and failed to show him 
the warrant when it was executed. The trial judge 
ruled that the accused did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy over the items seized from 
his garbage and that the search of his home was 
lawful. He rejected the accused’s evidence that he 
had asked to see the warrant. The accused was 
convicted of unlawfully producing, possessing and 
trafficking in ecstasy contrary to the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act. 
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing the evidence adduced at trial was 
obtained in violation of his rights under the Charter 
and ought to have been excluded. He submitted, in 
part, that the trial judge erred in concluding the 
warrantless searches of his garbage and the failure 
of police to show him the warrant did not breach his 
s.8 rights. In his view, the trial judge focused on his 
informational privacy, when the predominant privacy 
interest was territorial—the police trespassed over 
his property line.
In a 2:1 majority, the Alberta Court of Appeal 
upheld the trial judges ruling. Section 8 of the 
Charter guarantees everyone the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure. Justice 
Ritter continued:
Section 8 is intended to protect people, not 
places…Section 8 does not protect against every 
search or seizure, and requires a balance between 
a citizen’s reasonable expectation in maintaining 
privacy over one’s personal activities with the 
need of police officers to effectively investigate 
criminal activity. The critical question is whether 
a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists over the 
monitored activity. The requisite 
analysis involves a principled, 
non-categorical approach that 
focusses on the totality of the 
circumstances. Certain factors 
have been identified to assist in 
this analysis, which include, but 
are not limited to, the accused’s 
presence at the time of the 
search, possession or control of 
the property or place searched, 
ownership of the property or 
place, historical use of the 
property or item, ability to regulate access, 
existence of a subjective expectation of privacy, 
and the objective reasonableness of the 
expectation. [references omitted, para. 11] 
In this case, the majority found the accused 
abandoned any privacy interest he may have had in 
garbage that he placed in opaque green garbage 
bags and deposited into the garbage receptacle at 
the back of his property for pickup by city garbage 
personnel. Without a constitutionally protected 
privacy interest, there was no s.8 breach. In so 
holding, Justice Ritter examined several factors:
“Section 8 does not protect 
against every search or 
seizure, and requires a 
balance between a citizen’s 
reasonable expectation in 
maintaining privacy over one’s 
personal activities with the 
need of police officers to 
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• Presence/Absence of Accused—There was no 
evidence the accused was present during the 
search of the garbage. The Court presumed that 
the officers who reached into the receptacle 
were careful to ensure that he was not present 
at the time, since they even took steps on the 
first occasion to substitute garbage bags so 
that the accused would not be aware of the 
police presence. 
• Control Over the Property—The accused 
enjoyed little or no control over the garbage at 
the time of the searches. While technically still 
within the boundaries of his property, the 
accused relinquished control over his garbage, in 
a practical sense, by placing it into the garbage 
receptacle to be picked up by the garbage 
collectors. Anyone living in a major metropolitan 
area knows that once garbage is left for pickup, 
it may be subject to disturbance by bottle 
collectors and others looking for discarded 
treasures, as well birds, dogs, and vermin. 
Anyone placing garbage in an open receptacle 
enjoys virtually no control over it.
• Ownership of the Property—Whether the 
accused was the owner of the contents of the 
garbage bags depends on whether placement of 
the garbage bags in a receptacle designed for 
garbage pickup constitutes an abandonment of 
that garbage. After reviewing several cases, the 
majority was of the view that garbage is 
abandoned property and the source of the 
garbage did not enjoy a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in it.  In assessing abandonment, the 
intention to part with what is in the bag is 
important, not where it is put. Some of the 
cases reviewed involved garbage left on public 
lands adjacent to the resident’s property while 
others dealt with garbage on the resident’s land 
but placed for pickup. 
And citizens do not expect that garbage placed 
in opaque bags is entrusted to garbage 
collectors. Justice Ritter wrote:
In some cases…all household garbage goes to 
a sorting facility where all bags are opened 
and sorted so that compostables go to a 
composting facility, recyclable items are 
taken to a recycling facility, and the 
remaining garbage ends up in a landfill. This 
sorting process, which is carried out by 
individuals who can see what is in every 
garbage bag, demonstrates that any 
expectation of privacy is eliminated in the 
disposal of garbage. In other cases, much of 
the household garbage generated by an 
entire city is transported to disposal sites 
across great distances. Citizens could hardly 
expect that the trucks transporting garbage 
would never be involved in collisions 
compromising the load, or never lose a single 
item from their loads during a trip of 
literally hundreds of kilometres. One need 
only follow a garbage truck a short distance 
to realize that not all of its contents remain 
in the truck. Persons to whom garbage is 
entrusted have neither the obligation nor the 
means to protect the privacy of its doner. 
In effect, methods of garbage disposal are 
as varied as there are municipal jurisdictions. 
In virtually every jurisdiction, disposal is far 
from secure. This fact is demonstrated by 
the “not in my back yard” phenomenon that 
surrounds any attempt to establish a new 
disposal site anywhere. One invariable 
concern expressed by those living in the 
vicinity of a proposed disposal site is that 
refuse from the site will end up on their 
property. [paras. 26-27]
• Historical Use of the Property—Although the 
items contained in garbage cover the totality of 
human activity, ranging from the personal to 
the manifestly impersonal, and from items that 
disclose practically nothing about the person 
who is the source of the garbage, to items that 
may disclose intimate personal details about 
that person, the fact it is discarded indicates 
that it is unwanted and has no historical use at 
all. All garbage has one thing in common — it is 
no longer wanted. Often what may have 
historically been used for personal or intimate 
functions are discarded when it is irreparably 
broken or broken to a point where repair is 
uneconomical. There was nothing in the 
historical use of garbage to demonstrate that 
the accused maintained an expectation of 
privacy in it. 
• Ability to Regulate Access—The accused gave 
up all ability to regulate the use of the garbage. 
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The receptacle was open to anyone who 
wandered by the back of his property. Visually, 
the receptacle is hidden from view from inside 
the property but wide open from the outside. If 
the accused had been sitting on a lawn chair in 
his backyard, animals, bottle pickers, nosey 
neighbours, persons making use of his 
receptacle for their garbage, and the police 
might well inspect his garbage without him 
knowing that it was going on. For all practical 
purposes, his ability to regulate the use of the 
garbage was virtually nonexistent. Once the 
garbage was picked up, the accused lost what 
minimal ability he had to regulate access while 
it was in the receptacle. Although he argued 
that he would expect that it would be 
transported to a disposal site and be placed 
there exactly as it left the receptacle, citizens 
do not regard the garbage disposal system as a 
secure means of ensuring privacy. 
• Existence of a Subjective Expectation of 
Privacy—The accused did not have a subjective 
expectation of privacy in his abandoned 
garbage. Although he argued that garbage can 
reveal and expose intimate details of his 
lifestyle or core biographical data, such as 
lifestyle choices, DNA, and personal and 
financial choices, he did not testify on this issue 
and it was unknown what items were in his 
garbage that would have had this effect. “The 
only items that are specifically identified are 
those used by the police to obtain the warrant, 
and these items reveal that [he] was involved in 
criminal activity and little else,” said Justice 
Ritter. “They cannot constitute intimate details 
of lifestyle or core biographical details to which 
privacy protection ought to be extended.” 
Moreover, the fact that garbage, by its nature, 
can include items that expose intimate details 
or core biographical data about the person who 
generated the garbage does not alone lead to a 
presumption that the accused’s garbage would 
have included such information. Even if it did, 
any presumption is undermined by the reality 
that putting items in garbage bags and then 
leaving them for pickup in a publicly accessible 
receptacle amounts to an abandonment of those 
items, and any information that may derive from 
those items. 
• Objective Reasonableness of the Expectation—
Alberta’s Petty Trespass Act makes it an 
offence for anyone to enter on land that is 
surrounded by a fence. The accused’s garbage 
receptacle was built into the fence along his 
property line and the bags were either directly 
on the property line, or within garbage cans 
located on his property. Although the 
indentation faces the alley, the garbage 
receptacle belonged to him.  Even if the police 
committed a trespass, it was of a de minimis
nature. Furthermore, arguments that provincial 
statutes or municipal bylaws provide 
householders with any assurance that their 
garbage will be treated with confidence must 
always be tested against what actually happens 
in society. In this case the accused placed the 
garbage in the receptacle for pickup and had to 
expect that it would be removed by garbage 
personnel. He would also expect that living in a 
major metropolitan area, his garbage would 
potentially be subject to investigation by 
persons other than garbage personnel. Although 
the placement of garbage into a readily 
accessible receptacle does not, in law, amount to 
a licence to the public to inspect, it does serve 
to greatly reduce the viability of his assertion 
he expected his garbage was so sacrosanct that 
no one would ever lay their eyes on its content. 
Reasonable persons would not expect that 
garbage is secure and private, and would 
conclude that garbage is not obviously private in 
nature. 
The place searched was, at most, a garbage 
receptacle. It was not the accused’s house or garage 
or backpack or automobile. It was a place that raises 
minimum reaction in any assessment of the 
hierarchy of places that one would normally expect 
to be private. Finally, the trial judge did not err in 
considering that the place searched was the air 
space within the receptacle inside the fence line.
Since there was no expectation of privacy, there 
was no Charter breach and the police tactic in 
examining the garbage was constitutional. 
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DUTY COUNSEL SYSTEM FAILED 
ARRESTEE: 
s.10(b) BREACH MADE OUT
R. v. Osmond, 2007 BCCA 470
The body of 13-year-old girl was found 
in a shallow grave in a wooded area 
directly behind her home in a small 
community. She was naked below the 
waist and had sustained significant bodily injury.  
Scrap lumber and greenery had been thrown over her 
in an effort to conceal her. A forensic pathologist 
determined the girl’s death was caused by blows to 
the head, strangulation, and stab wounds.  She also 
had an acute laceration and contusions to her vagina. 
In the days immediately following the murder, many 
people observed a long scratch down the front of the 
accused’s neck. He was a 21-year-old man who lived 
nearby. A DNA analysis of the girl’s fingernail 
clippings matched the accused’s DNA and he was 
arrested for the first degree murder.  
On arrival at the detachment, the accused was asked 
if he knew a lawyer. He mentioned one who 
represented him on a youth matter several years 
prior but wasn’t sure if he needed one. One of the 
officers involved in the arrest knew of the lawyer 
the accused was referring to and where he 
practiced, but did nothing to help locate him. He was 
warned and given the appropriate 10(b) Charter 
advisory but thought he would find out what the 
police had on him so he could discuss it with a lawyer 
after the weekend. He was urged to make a call to 
duty counsel. 
A call was placed to a toll-free answering service 
which paged the on call (Brydges) lawyer, who 
returned the call. The call was transferred to a room 
where the accused was alone. The duty counsel 
lawyer spoke to the accused for about two minutes, 
telling him about his right to silence. He told the 
accused not to say anything to the police or to 
anyone in cells. The duty counsel lawyer did not 
recommend any local 
lawyers who could attend 
to the accused before 
police questioning nor did 
he know any criminal 
lawyers in the area. The 
accused had no access to a 
phone book or list of legal aid lawyers, nor did the 
police assist him in contacting his former lawyer or 
let him visit his father or girlfriend who could have 
arranged for a lawyer. The accused then spoke to 
the police and in the course of two lengthy 
interviews he confessed to killing the girl and 
disposing of her body in the woods behind her 
residence. 
  
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused challenged the admissibility of his 
confessions on the basis that they were not 
voluntary and that his right to counsel under s.10(b) 
of the Charter was violated. The trial judge 
disagreed and admitted the statements. He was 
convicted of first degree murder. 
The accused appealed his conviction to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing he was denied his 
right to counsel under s.10(b).  Justice Donald, 
writing the opinion for the three member Court of 
Appeal agreed. The privilege against self 
incrimination at common law is found in s.7 of the 
Charter as a principle of fundamental justice and is 
closely linked to the right to silence and the right to 
counsel under s.10(b). The right to silence gives the 
detainee the right to chose whether to speak to the 
authorities or not (by remaining silent). Section 10(b) 
requires the police to advise a detainee of their 
right to consult counsel and give them an opportunity 
to do so without delay. One of the most important 
pieces of legal advice one gets from exercising their 
s.10(b) right is understanding their right to silence.  
This includes both confirming the existence of the 
right to remain silent and also getting advice on how 
to exercise it.  
In this case, the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
concluded the duty counsel call was entirely 
inadequate. The accused was 21 years old, immature, 
over-confident, had not completed high school and 
was obviously unsophisticated. He was a labourer 
from a remote, tiny, resource based community on 
the west coast of Vancouver Island. He foolishly 
thought he could talk his way out of the situation he 
found himself in. As 
Justice Donald noted, “he 
did not have the savoir 
faire to know he was 
hopelessly outmatched by a 
trained R.C.M.P. officer 
FAMILIAR FRENCH PHRASES:
“savoir faire”- tact; know how; ready knowledge of 
what to do or say, and of when and how to do or say 
it; capacity for appropriate action.
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from the Serious Crimes Unit.” The accused was 
isolated and faced interrogation after a two minute 
phone call from a remote stranger with no local 
knowledge. His Friday arrest meant access to a 
lawyer was problematic. He would be held in police 
cells over the weekend and could be readily accessed 
by police. He was denied contact with his father and 
girlfriend until after interrogation.  In holding the 
accused’s right to counsel had been breached, 
Justice Donald stated:
When the call [with duty counsel] was over, the 
interrogation began.  The [accused] obviously did 
not appreciate his position.  He did not know that 
he needed to have a more detailed discussion 
about how to handle the interview so as to 
protect himself.  He carried on in an attempt to 
find out what the police had as evidence against 
him.  Had he discussed this approach with a 
lawyer with more time and interest in his case, 
he would have been told that he should not try 
to persuade the police that he is innocent, and 
that he should let a lawyer gather particulars 
from the police. 
The [accused] tried to argue his case with the 
police.  He took the line that if he committed the 
murder, why would he have volunteered a DNA 
sample, how could he have forgotten such a thing 
or behaved normally, as he did for the several 
intervening weeks?  He eventually gave in to the 
constable's stratagem that he needed to know 
what happened to assure the [accused’s] father, 
girlfriend, and his community that this was an 
unplanned event and that he was not a predator.  
Stepping back from these circumstances and 
assessing them from a fair treatment 
perspective, here is a young, unsophisticated 
accused in custody with the benefit of a two-
minute phone call, put against a skilled 
interrogator lawfully entitled to persuade him to 
ignore the lawyer's advice and to employ a range 
of techniques within the generous ambit 
permitted by R. v. Oickle … 2000 SCC 38, and 
more recently, R. v. Spencer … 2007 SCC 11.  If 
that is all that s. 10(b) provides in a case of first 
degree murder, the Charter protection is largely 
illusory.  
………
To summarize, a detainee under arrest has the 
right to remain silent.  This integrates with the 
privilege against self-incrimination:  s. 7.  He is 
entitled to timely and effective access to 
counsel prior to police interrogation:   s.  10(b).  
Immediate advice of counsel addresses not only 
the right to remain silent but also how to 
exercise that right.   Police are obliged to 
facilitate access to counsel within reason – the 
implementational duty.
These rights serve the principle of fair 
treatment of an individual under the control of 
the state.   The Brydges [duty counsel] line 
system failed in this case to meet the needs of 
the [accused’s] situation.  It did not constitute 
access to counsel and since the police did not 
implement access in any other form, the 
[accused’s] s.  10(b) rights were denied. [paras. 
51-56]
The statements were conscriptive, excluded under 
s. 24(2) of the Charter, and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
FIREARM USE REQUIRES GUN 
IN PHYSICAL POSSESSION OR 
READILY AT HAND 
R. v. Steele, 2007 SCC 36
The accused and three accomplices 
broke and entered a home expecting to 
find a grow operation and no one there. 
They picked the wrong house and three 
occupants were sleeping. The occupants were awaken 
and one of the intruders warned a female resident 
not to move while adding, “We have a gun”. The 
female also noted he had something in his hand about 
the size of a gun. Another female resident heard a 
second intruder tell an accomplice twice to “Get the 
gun.” She then saw one of the intruders pull a dark 
metal object from inside his jacket. A third resident 
heard one of the intruders say, “Get the gun out.” All 
four suspects fled the home within five minutes of 
their arrival.
About four minutes after a 911 call was received, the 
police stopped a vehicle matching the description of 
the getaway car. Four individuals, including the 
accused, were found inside the vehicle and they were 
all arrested. The police searched the car and found 
several weapons, including a loaded handgun under 
the driver’s seat. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused was convicted of several offences, including 
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conduct alleged in each instance amounted to use 
of the firearm in question.  They cannot be said to 
have articulated a principled test that fully 
captures the type of conduct that rises to the 
level of “use” within the meaning of s. 85(1). 
[references omitted, paras. 27-28]
Then after reviewing dictionary definitions of the 
word “use, he said:
In the absence of a statutory definition, 
I would therefore hold that an offender 
“uses” a firearm, within the meaning of 
s. 85(1), where, to facilitate the 
commission of an offence or for 
purposes of escape, the offender 
reveals by words or conduct the actual 
presence or immediate availability of a 
firearm.  The weapon must then be in the 
physical possession of the offender or 
readily at hand. 
Where two or more offenders are acting 
in concert, the usual rules of complicity 
apply. It will therefore be sufficient, 
where one of the offenders is in physical 
possession of a firearm or has immediate access 
to it, for another to utter the firearm-related 
threat.
………
I take care to add that this test does not bring 
within s. 85(1) of the Criminal Code any threat — 
including an idle threat — that refers to a 
firearm.  Use, at least in this regard, is a matter 
of fact, not fiction.   Section 85(1) does not 
capture the threatened use of a non-existent 
firearm.  However effective and objectionable, it 
is the threat in that case that is “used”, and not a 
firearm.   Moreover, had Parliament intended to 
capture idle threats under s. 85(1), it would have 
said so expressly, as it did in ss. 267 and 272 of 
the Criminal Code. [references omitted, paras. 
32-35]
Justice Fish, however, rejected the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal’s approach that “use” of a firearm 
under s.85(1) could be satisfied on evidence that the 
weapon was “proximate for future use”. He held that 
this test did not provide any real measure or 
indication of the degree of proximity required—how 
near to in space or time the weapon must be to the 
predicate offence. It also would cast too wide a net. 
Rather than being concerned with future use, s.85(1) 
is concerned with present use. 
s.85(1) of the Criminal Code for using a firearm while 
committing break and enter. His appeal to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal was unsuccessful. The 
Appeal Court held that “possession of a firearm 
becomes use under s.85(1) of the Criminal Code when 
its use is threatened.” The loaded handgun that was 
found in the car was either in the physical possession 
of one of the intruders while in the house or in the 
car immediately outside, making 
it sufficiently available to carry 
out the implicit threats 
respecting the gun by the 
intruders inside the residence. 
The firearm was “proximate for 
future use.” The trial judge’s 
guilty verdict for the s.85(1) 
offence was therefore 
supported by the evidence. 
The accused then 
unsuccessfully appealed his 
conviction to the Supreme Court 
of Canada. In a  unanimous 
judgment Canada’s highest 
court upheld the conviction. Section 85(1) creates an 
offence for using a firearm while committing an 
indictable offence (such as break and enter), while 
attempting to commit an indictable offence, or 
during flight after committing or attempting to 
commit an indictable offence, whether or not the 
person causes or means to cause bodily harm. A 
conviction for this offence carries a minimum 
sentence of one year in prison, to be served 
consecutively to the sentence for the predicate 
offence. 
Justice Fish, writing the opinion for the court, 
examined case law surrounding the meaning of using 
a firearm. He stated:
“Use” has been held to include discharging a 
firearm, pointing a firearm, “pulling out a firearm 
which the offender has upon his person and 
holding it in his hand to intimidate another”, and 
displaying a firearm for the purpose of 
intimidation.  …“[U]se of firearm” may include 
revealing its presence by word or deed.
It is thus settled law that use and mere 
possession (or “being armed”) are not 
synonymous.   But courts have almost invariably 
determined on a case-by-case basis whether the 
“I would therefore hold that an 
offender “uses” a firearm, within 
the meaning of s. 85(1), where, 
to facilitate the commission of 
an offence or for purposes of 
escape, the offender reveals by 
words or conduct the actual 
presence or immediate 
availability of a firearm.  The 
weapon must then be in the 
physical possession of the 
offender or readily at hand.” 
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In this case, the trial judge was satisfied the 
firearm seized from the getaway car was brought 
into the home by one of the intruders and remained 
within the physical possession of that intruder or 
another, during the break and enter. From the facts 
and circumstances it was not unreasonable to infer 
that the intruders brought the gun into the home 
and that it was in the physical possession of one of 
them, to the knowledge of all, during the break in. 
Section 21 of the Criminal Code (parties to the 
offence) applies to s.85(1) and it wasn’t necessary 
for the trial judge to find that the accused 
personally brought the gun inside the home or 
physically possessed it or even personally uttered 
the threats. Several intruders, including the 
accused, were acting in concert making him a party 
to the s.85(1) offence. And even if the firearm was 
not brought into the house Justice Fish concluded 
with this observation:
We are dealing in this case with a break and enter 
committed by several intruders acting in concert.  
Even if they had left their charged firearm in the 
getaway car when they entered the Reid home, 
any one of them could easily have slipped away 
momentarily to retrieve it from the car, parked 
just outside, without interrupting the commission 
of the offence.
In these circumstances, applying the test I have 
set out, the trial judge could have properly 
concluded that the intruders used the firearm, 
within the meaning of s.  85(1) of the Criminal 
Code, even if they did not have it in their physical 
possession while in the Reid home. [paras. 55-56]
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
POLICE MUST TELL YOUTH THAT 
CONSULTED ADULT MUST BE 
PRESENT
R. v. S.S., 2007 ONCA 481
After receiving an anonymous tip, a 
police officer in charge of a 
convenience store robbery 
investigation contacted the 17 year 
old accused about his possible involvement. The 
accused was told he had been named as a suspect and 
agreed to an interview at the police station. The next 
day the police investigator picked up the accused at 
his home and drove him to the police station. The 
interview was videotaped and the officer reviewed a 
Statement of a Young Person form with him. He told 
the accused he was investigating a robbery, but that 
he was not under arrest, and that he was under no 
obligation to make a statement and that any 
statement he did make could be used as evidence. He 
was also advised he could consult a lawyer, about the 
availability of legal aid, and about his right to consult 
with an adult, which included the right to have the 
adult present when giving a statement. However, the 
officer did not explain that any statement was 
required to be made in the presence of any consulted 
third party. At the end of an hour long interview in 
which the officer used skilled interview techniques 
(expressing empathy, interest in his personal life, 
implying DNA and video evidence, and personal 
appeals), the accused provided a statement and was 
arrested and charged.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the judge 
found that the police informed the accused about his 
right to have a lawyer or other adult present when 
he gave a statement, but failed to tell him that the 
statement must be taken in the presence of the 
person(s) consulted. Thus, the statement was not 
taken in accordance with s.146(2)(b)(iv) of the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act (YCJA). The statement was 
therefore inadmissible and the accused was 
acquitted.
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that there was no difference in 
substance between a “right” to have the consulted 
third party present and the “requirement” that they 
be present. And even if there was a difference, the 
Crown submitted that the critical information 
required by s.146(2)(b)(iv) was substantially 
complied with because the information was conveyed 
to the accused and understood by him. The accused, 
on the other hand, contended that there was a 
significant difference between being told about the 
right to have the consulted third party present and 
being told the statement is required to be made in 
the presence of the third party. 
Justice Lang for the unanimous Ontario Court of 
Appeal, first recognized that there were three 
areas of law that governed the admissibility of 
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The distinction is consistent with the purpose 
of protecting young people in light of their lack 
of maturity and their susceptibility to yield to 
authority.  If a young person is informed that, 
if they consult a third party, that person must 
be present during the taking of a statement, 
the young person will be alerted by that 
information to the significance of any 
statement he or she may provide and, 
importantly, will be in a better position to make 
an informed decision about whether to consult 
a lawyer or an adult.   In other words, 
information that any statement must be made 
in the presence of any consulted third party is 
critical so that the young person can make an 
informed decision about whether to consult a 
lawyer or an adult in the first place. Thus, in my 
view, the “requirement” provides important 
information that is essential to the enhanced 
procedural protection provided by s. 146(2).
Further, s. 146(2)(b) required [the 
investigating officer] to “clearly” explain the 
information set out in that subsection.   It 
cannot be a “clear” explanation if the police fail 
to tell the young person that counsel and any 
other consulted third party must be present 
during the taking of any statement.  As I have 
said, only after the police obligations have been 
“clearly explained” to the young person, and he 
or she has been given all the required 
information, can the young person provide an 
informed answer to the question of whether he 
or she “desires otherwise”. 
The importance of providing the young person 
with the tools necessary to make an informed 
decision is particularly important because the 
YCJA does not require any notice to parents (or 
parental equivalents or substitutes) when the 
police want to interview a young person.   No 
notice is required until the young person is 
arrested and detained in custody or until a 
summons or appearance notice is issued.   The 
absence of parental notification when a young 
person is taken for questioning underscores the 
importance of ensuring that the young person is 
fully informed of his or her procedural 
protections before he or she makes a decision. 
This interpretation of s. 146(2)(b)(iv) is 
consistent with the objectives and principles of 
the YCJA.   In addition, it does not place an 
undue burden on the police.  It is not difficult 
to tell the young person about the requirements 
1. the common law rule of voluntariness 
(confessions rule);
2. the Charter; and
3. the statutory safeguards provided by the 
YCJA.
In terms of s.146(2)(b)(iv), Justice Lang stated: 
…s. 146(2)(b)(iv) is an enhanced procedural 
protection that Parliament deemed important, 
among other purposes, to provide reasonable 
protection for a young person confronted by 
police officers seeking a statement.   As the 
Supreme Court of Canada has explained, this 
protection is important because, no matter how 
well-intentioned the officer, young persons are 
susceptible to feeling intimidated by the police, 
whom they consider to be persons of 
significant authority and power.   In addition, 
young persons may lack the maturity to 
consider the consequences of unburdening 
themselves of their misdeeds, particularly 
when encouraged to do so by an apparently 
understanding (or, alternatively, formidable) 
police officer. 
As for whether s.146(2)(b)(iv) was merely a right of 
a young person or imposed an obligation on the police 
to tell them about the requirement, the Court looked 
at the context and parliamentary purpose of the 
enhanced procedural protections of the YCJA 
stating: 
…in my view, the failure to tell the [accused] 
about the requirement on the police was a 
breach of s. 146(2)(b)(iv).  That breach denied 
the young person important information that 
would have enabled him to decide whether to 
consult a third party. 
I reach this conclusion because, on a plain 
reading of the legislation, there is an important 
distinction drawn between a “right” of a young 
person on the one hand and a “requirement” put 
on the police on the other.  That this distinction 
was intentional is apparent from a consideration 
of the structure of s. 146(2)(b).  While s. 
146(2)(b)(iii) refers to a young person’s “right” 
to consult counsel, in contrast, s. 146(2)(b)(iv) 
expressly places an obligation on the 
police.  Thus, it is clear that Parliament 
deliberately distinguished between information 
about a young person’s right and about an 
obligation on the police. 
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of the section.   It is apparent that a uniform 
form that correctly addresses all of the 
procedural protections would facilitate uniform 
compliance with s. 146(2) and, more 
importantly, would ensure that a young person 
had his or her rights, and the obligations of the 
police, clearly explained.  [paras. 32-37]
The police must, therefore, make it clear to the 
young person that the person consulted must be 
present when their statement is made. It is not 
enough just to advise them of their right to have the 
person consulted present. And “since the [accused] 
was deprived of a substantial informational 
component of s. 146(2)(b)(iv), the breach cannot be 
considered a “technical irregularity” of the kind to 
invoke a consideration of s. 146(6).” 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
DETENTION NOT AUTOMATIC 
WHEN POLICE APPROACH AND 
TALK
R. v. L.B., 2007 ONCA 596
In the early afternoon two plainclothes 
detectives driving an unmarked police 
car noticed a young male partially 
seated on the railing of a walkway 
leading up to the grounds of a high school. They saw 
the youth turn his head and look up towards the top 
of the stairs where they saw a second young male, 
the accused, seated on the school grounds, just 
inside a fence at the upper end of the walkway. The 
officers continued for a short distance and then 
turned around and watched the youth at the bottom 
of the staircase. He was glancing around and looking 
up in the general direction of the accused and 
appeared to be speaking to him. This led the officers 
to believe that although the two youths (both 15 
years old) were physically separated, they were in 
fact “together”. Their conduct aroused the 
suspicions of the officers. 
After several minutes, the officers decided to speak 
to the two youths to find out what they were doing. 
They parked their police car in the lane opposite to 
the natural flow of traffic, got out of the car, and an 
officer looked over the roof of the car at the 
youths, displayed his police badge and warrant card 
and called out “Toronto Police”. At that point, one of 
the officers got a better look at the accused, who 
was seated at the top of the slope on school 
property. He was crouched with his knees in the air, 
and he had a black bag or satchel in his right hand. 
He stood up immediately and held the bag low behind 
his right thigh. He then crossed the top of the 
walkway and passed a pole attached to a chain-link 
fence, before proceeding down the stairs towards 
the two officers. The accused’s actions caught the 
officers somewhat off-guard. While it was their 
intention to speak to both youths, the accused 
walked directly up to an officer without being 
summoned or directed to do so. The officer struck 
up a casual conversation with the accused while his 
partner casually conversed with the other youth. 
 
Both youths were asked for their names and date of 
births. They were checked on CPIC and one was 
recognized as someone dealt with three weeks 
earlier on robbery charges. It was also noticed that 
the accused was not carrying the black bag that he 
had been holding at the top of the walkway. 
Accordingly, an officer walked up the stairs to the 
area where the accused had been seated and started 
to look around. At this point, the accused began 
showing signs of nervousness—he was fidgety, 
pacing, and looking around. In light of this behaviour, 
the police had safety concerns and prevented the 
youth from communicating with each other by 
interrupting their conversations verbally with more 
casual conversation.  At the top of the stairs, the 
black bag was quickly located on the grass with some 
litter. The officer called down to the youth, who 
were at the bottom of the stairs and asked, “whose 
bag is this”. The accused replied “I don’t know” while 
the other youth did not respond. Because of the 
accused’s response and the fact that he had 
distanced himself physically from the bag, the 
officer treated the bag as abandoned property and 
opened it. Inside, he located school work with the 
accused’s name on it along with a loaded .22 calibre 
handgun. Both youth were then arrested at gunpoint 
and the accused was subsequently charged with 
possessing a loaded restricted firearm and several 
other gun charges.
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, both 
officers agreed that they had no cause to detain the 
youths and if either youth had chosen to walk away 
or stop answering questions, he could have done so 
with impunity. They testified their encounter with 
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the youths was brief, between one and three 
minutes, and that no physical contact occurred until 
the arrest. The accused argued his rights under ss. 
8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter had been violated and 
that the gun’s admission into evidence would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute and 
should therefore be excluded under s.24(2). 
The trial judge concluded that the accused was 
detained by the police when he was asked for 
identification and waited for the CPIC results. 
Although the officers did not physically restrain the 
accused, nor assume control over his movement by a 
direction or demand, the accused was psychologically 
detained. The police, however, did not have 
justification for the detention and it was therefore 
arbitrary and violated s.9. The police also failed to 
advise the accused of his right to counsel under 
s.10(b) before questioning him about the ownership 
of the knapsack. And finally, the police breached s.8 
when they searched the 
knapsack without lawful 
authority. The gun was 
excluded as evidence and 
the accused was acquitted 
of all charges. 
The Crown appealed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing the trial judge 
erred in holding that the 
accused was detained when 
he was asked about the 
ownership of the knapsack. Justice Moldaver, 
authoring the judgment of the Court, ruled that the 
trial judge came to the wrong conclusion in finding a 
detention. In the Court of Appeal’s view, the accused 
had not been detained when he was asked about the 
knapsack nor at any time leading up to his arrest. 
There is no simple test that can be applied in 
deciding whether a psychological detention has 
occurred. Each case will be fact-specific. Whether 
or not a detention has occurred does not depend on 
whether there is reasonable grounds to detain 
(formerly known as articulable cause). Although the 
existence of reasonable grounds to detain allows the 
police to lawfully detain a person for a brief period 
of time it does not assist in determining whether a 
detention has occurred in the first place. As Justice 
Moldaver noted:
The fact that the police may have reasonable 
grounds to detain someone does not mean that 
detention will automatically occur when the 
police approach and start talking to that person; 
the same holds true when the police do not have 
reasonable grounds to detain. To repeat, we have 
not yet reached the point that compulsion to 
comply will be inferred whenever a police officer 
requests information. [para. 56]
In this case, the accused “bore the onus of 
establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that he 
was psychologically detained.” It did not help his 
cause that he failed to testify. The evidence of the 
officers, on the other hand, undermined his 
assertion that he was detained. The Court stated:
According to the officers, they did not demand 
anything of the [accused], nor did they direct him 
to do anything. On the contrary, it was the 
[accused] who cast aside the black bag 
and, without prompting, walked down the 
stairs and approached the officers. He did 
so of his own volition. His conduct actually 
caught the officers off-guard, and in my 
view, it speaks volumes against his position 
that he was psychologically detained.
The [accused’s] conduct in approaching 
the officers hardly fits the image of a 
frightened youth who felt psychologically 
compelled to submit to the police in 
deprivation of his liberty. On the 
contrary, it speaks to a street-wise teenager who 
quickly sized up the situation and determined that 
his best defence in the circumstances was a 
strong offence. Put simply, this was not a case of 
psychological compulsion exerted by the police; it 
was a case of psychological control attempted by 
the [accused].
And when the [accused] realized that his ploy was 
not working, he began to panic. That explains his 
nervous behaviour when [the officer] walked up 
the stairs and began to search for the black 
knapsack. … At the very least, the evidence is as 
consistent with [the fear of being caught] as it is 
with the scenario urged by the [accused] (feeling 
compelled to respond to the police).
I do not suggest that the [accused] did not feel 
some stress in the situation. No doubt, he felt 
somewhat intimidated by the police given the 
“The fact that the police may have 
reasonable grounds to detain 
someone does not mean that 
detention will automatically occur 
when the police approach and 
start talking to that person; the 
same holds true when the police 
do not have reasonable grounds 
to detain.” 
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obvious power imbalance that existed. He may also 
have felt some anxiety by reason of the 
positioning of the police car, the fact that both 
officers got out of the car and the manner in 
which [the officer] attempted to prevent him and 
[his companion] from communicating with each 
other. The trial judge quite properly took those 
factors into account in assessing the issue of 
detention. But respectfully, he went wrong on the 
legal test. In my view, had he applied the correct 
legal test to the uncontradicted evidence of the 
officers and placed the onus on the [accused], 
where it belonged, he would have found that 
psychological compulsion had not been made out, 
at least not on a balance of probabilities. In the 
circumstances, evidence from the [accused] was a 
virtual must, and it was not forthcoming.
In assessing whether the [accused] was detained, 
the trial judge took into account other factors 
that in my respectful view, he should not have. 
Specifically, I do not consider it relevant that one 
of the officers “had had dealings with one of the 
males [his companion] only weeks earlier”. [The 
accused’s companion’s] detention was not in issue 
and nothing in the record indicates that [the 
accused] was even aware of [his companion’s] prior 
difficulties with the police. 
Nor do I consider it relevant that the police 
“drove by and returned to question the accused”, 
rather than simply “driv[ing] up and stop[ping]”. 
With respect, I am not at all sure that I 
understand the difference. Regardless, there is 
no evidence that [the accused] saw the police 
drive by and no evidence that this had any impact 
on him if he did.
Finally, I fail to see how “the running of CPIC 
checks” was significant in the circumstances of 
this case. [The accused] did not testify and there 
is no evidence he knew that [the officer] was 
doing a CPIC check on him when he used his 
hand-held radio, or if he did, that it had any 
impact on him. [paras. 61-67]
If the trial judge had applied the proper legal 
principles he would have concluded there was 
virtually nothing to substantiate a finding of 
psychological detention. Since there was no 
detention, there was no requirement that the 
officer advise the accused of his right to counsel 
before questioning him about the bag. His response 
was therefore admissible and the officer could rely 
on it in deciding the bag had been abandoned. The 
accused had disclaimed any privacy interest in the 
bag and could not rely on s.8 to challenge the 
lawfulness of the officers search. The police did not 
breach the accused’s rights and there was no reason 
to turn to s.24(2) of the Charter. 
In any event, even if the accused’s Charter rights 
were breached, the evidence of the gun should be 
admissible under s.24(2). The officers acted in good 
faith and would have inadvertently “crossed the 
‘murky’ line between legitimate questioning and 
arbitrary detention.” There was no evidence the 
police were motivated by racial profiling or 
harassment. Further, the offences for which the 
accused was charged were very serious:
This case involves a loaded handgun in the 
possession of a student on school property. 
Conduct of that nature is unacceptable without 
exception. It is something that Canadians will not 
tolerate. It conjures up images of horror and 
anguish the likes of which few could have 
imagined twenty-five years ago when the Charter 
first came to being. Sadly, in recent times, such 
images have become all too common – children left 
dead and dying; families overcome by grief and 
sorrow; communities left reeling in shock and 
disbelief.
That is the backdrop of this case and in my view, 
it provides the context within which the conduct 
of the police should be measured, for purposes of 
s. 24(2), in deciding whether we should be 
excluding completely reliable evidence (here, the 
gun) and freeing potentially dangerous people 
without a trial on the merits. 
Viewed that way, I believe that absent egregious 
conduct on the part of the police, most Canadians 
would find it unconscionable for [the accused] to 
be set free without a trial on the merits. By 
egregious conduct, I have in mind conduct that 
the community simply would not countenance, 
even if this meant allowing a potentially violent 
criminal to escape punishment.   Without being 
specific, it would involve conduct that showed 
disdain for the rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the Charter and that struck at the core values 
those rights and freedoms were meant to 
protect. No such conduct (or anything close to it) 
exists in this case. It follows, in my view, that the 
gun should have been admitted into evidence 
under s. 24(2). [para. 80-82]
The appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittals set 
aside, and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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R. v. Anthony, 2007 ONCA 609
A police officer arrived at the scene of 
a suspicious sudden death at the 
accused’s apartment.   He was told by 
another investigator to get a statement 
from him.  The officer went into the apartment and 
saw the female victim lying nude with a lot of blood 
around her hips.   He believed that foul play was a 
possibility and that the situation appeared a “little 
suspicious”, but he did not have reasonable grounds 
to believe an offence had been committed. The 
officer approached the accused and said that police 
“needed” to take a statement from him.  They walked 
to the police cruiser and the accused asked to sit in 
the front seat, but the officer asked him to sit in 
the back.   The officer again said that the police 
“needed” his help.   He did not caution the accused 
about his right to counsel or his right to silence.
The accused disclosed that he had “normal sex” 
twice with the victim when she was either 
unconscious or dead. He said that after he 
penetrated her with his fist, he washed his hands 
and came back and had normal sex.  He then said that 
much later in the morning after he woke up he got 
angry with the victim. She would not wake up so he 
thought she was passed out drunk.   He then went 
back into bed with her and had normal sex. The 
victim had bled to death from massive internal 
injuries. The accused was charged with first degree 
murder under s.235(5)(b) of the Criminal Code—
causing death while committing sexual assault. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused was convicted of murder. Experts testified 
that the accused’s fist thrusts into the victim’s 
vagina and anus would 
have caused such 
excruciating pain that 
no one could have 
tolerated them or 
consented to that level 
of injury. As for his 
statement to the 
officer on scene, the 
trial judge found that 
he was not detained when he made it and that it was 
voluntary. He was sentenced to life in prison without 
parole eligibility for 25 years. 
The accused appealed his conviction to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal submitting, among other grounds, 
that the trial judge erred in holding that he was not 
detained and therefore was not entitled to be 
advised of his right to counsel. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal unanimously dismissed the accused’s appeal 
on this issue. Justice Laskin pointed out that if the 
accused was detained when he gave his statement to 
the officer at the scene, he was entitled to be 
advised of his right to counsel. However, the trial 
judge ruled he was not, a decision well supported by 
the evidence. Justice Laskin stated:
At the heart of a detention – in this case an 
alleged psychological detention – is compulsion.  An 
individual acquiesces to a demand by the police 
because the individual reasonably believes there 
is no choice but to comply.  
In [the officer’s] interview of [the accused], the 
trial judge found no compulsion.   The following 
evidence reasonably supports his finding:
• The trial judge characterized [the officer’s] 
“need” for a statement as a request, not a 
demand.   This characterization was 
reasonable.   As the trial judge held, this 
request was not “imbued with the 
psychological compulsion that the courts are 
vigilant for.”
• [The officer] interviewed [the accused] for 
over an hour, but his questions did not 
contribute to an atmosphere of oppression or 
compulsion.  Indeed, he asked few questions, 
and those he asked were mainly “tell me what 
happened.”   [The accused] was eager to tell 
his story.   [The officer] listened and took 
notes.
• The location for the interview did not create 
an atmosphere of oppression or compulsion.  
The back of the police cruiser was selected 
for its convenience and privacy.  Although the 
door was closed, [the accused] was allowed to 
leave, and did so to get a glass of water and 
smoke a cigarette.
• When the interview took place, [the officer] 
did not believe that [the accused] had 
committed a criminal offence.   He certainly 
“At the heart of a detention –
in this case an alleged 
psychological detention – 
is compulsion.  An individual 
acquiesces to a demand by the 
police because the individual 
reasonably believes there is no 
choice but to comply.” 
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did not have reasonable and probably grounds 
to arrest him.  He was simply inquiring into a 
suspicious death.
• The police did not know that [the victim’s] 
death resulted from a crime until the delivery 
of the autopsy report the following day.  The 
report concluded that [the victim] could not 
have consented to the acts that caused her 
death.  [The officer] did not know this critical 
piece of information when he interviewed [the 
accused].
• As [the accused] did not testify on the voir 
dire, there was no evidence from him that he 
felt compelled to comply with [the officer’s] 
request for a statement.
Without a finding of detention, there was no need to 
advise the accused of his right to counsel under 
s.10(b). The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
 VEHICLE PASSENGER’s ID 
REQUEST BREACHES CHARTER
R. v. Harris, 2007 ONCA 574
A police officer stopped a van after 
watching it make a left turn without 
signaling. He found three people in it; 
the driver, the accused (seated in the 
front passenger seat without his 
seatbelt on), and a woman sitting in the 
back. The officer was concerned with his safety 
after he saw the accused lean forward with his left 
hand down the small of his back. All the occupants 
were ordered to keep their hands in view. 
The driver produced his licence, ownership, and 
insurance documents when asked, and the accused 
and female passenger were asked to identify 
themselves. They did so and their names 
were run through CPIC. The accused was 
arrested after it was learned he was on 
bail, with a curfew that he was 
breaching.  During a search, a large bulge 
was detected protruding from his lower 
back, tucked into the waistband of his 
underwear. It turned out to be a package 
containing 17 grams of cocaine. The 
accused was then arrested for 
possessing cocaine and advised of his right to 
counsel. The other two occupants were released 
without charge, but the accused was charged with 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the trial 
judge found the officer was entitled to stop the 
vehicle under Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act (HTA) 
for the apparent violation. However, she held the 
officer’s request for identification from the accused 
was not related to the seatbelt infraction, but was 
merely made out of routine, to check on CPIC. 
Because the request for identification had nothing 
to do with the enforcement of the HTA, the 
detention changed from a lawful stop to an arbitrary 
one, thus breaching the accused’s rights under s.9 of 
the Charter. The judge also found that the accused 
was denied his right to counsel under s.10(b) and was 
subject to an unconstitutional search when he was 
asked to identify himself. The cocaine seized was 
held inadmissible under s.24(2) and the accused was 
acquitted.
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing that there were no Charter breaches and 
that even if there were, the evidence should not 
have been excluded under s.24(2). The Ontario Court 
of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal and admitted 
the evidence despite a finding the police violated the 
accused’s rights.
The Detention
Determining whether or not a person is detained 
involves a fact-specific inquiry. The Court described 
detention as follows:
A person is detained when physically restrained by 
the police.   Psychological restraint will also 
constitute detention.  A person who complies with 
a police direction or command reasonably believing 
that he or she has no choice 
is detained for the purposes 
of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter. 
[references omitted, para. 17]
Justice Doherty, writing the 
majority opinion of the Court, 
declined to decide whether 
the accused, a passenger in 
the vehicle, was detained the 
moment the vehicle was pulled 
“Psychological restraint will also 
constitute detention.  A person 
who complies with a police 
direction or command 
reasonably believing that he or 
she has no choice is detained for 
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over. He did, however, hold a psychological detention 
of the accused occurred when he was ordered to 
keep his hands in open view. He would have 
reasonably understood that he was not free to leave 
the vehicle at that point. He therefore was detained 
during the remaining encounter with the officer and 
was detained when asked to identify himself.
The detention, however, was not arbitrary as ruled 
by the trial judge. The officer was entitled to pull 
the vehicle over for the traffic violation under the 
HTA and was acting lawfully when he took control of 
the movement of the passengers in the vehicle as he 
approached it. In overruling the trial judge on 
finding the detention arbitrary, Justice Doherty 
stated:
I cannot agree that the request of [the accused] 
for identification for purposes unrelated to the 
Highway Traffic Act altered the constitutionality 
of his detention.  [He] was detained by virtue of 
the lawful stopping of the vehicle, the ongoing 
investigation of the Highway Traffic Act 
violation, and [the officer’s] lawful assuming of 
control over the movements of the passengers in 
the vehicle.  On the trial judge’s factual findings, 
[the officer’s] request for identification did not 
prolong or alter the nature of [the accused’s] 
detention.   He remained in exactly the same 
position he would have been in had [the officer] 
questioned only the driver.  
[The accused’s] detention, that is the limitation 
on his personal physical freedom imposed by [the 
officer’s] actions, was not arbitrary in the sense 
that it was random or without individualized 
cause.   The detention flowed from the officer’s 
observations of the vehicle, his decision to pursue 
the Highway Traffic Act investigation, and the 
reasonable steps he took to assume control of the 
occupants of the vehicle. As the trial judge 
observed, these observations 
gave [the officer] proper grounds 
to detain the passengers in the 
vehicle during the Highway 
Traffic Act investigation.   In my 
view, the request that [the 
accused] identify himself, even 
though improper for the reasons 
set out below, did not render [the 
accused’s] detention arbitrary. 
[paras. 26-27]
Although the majority concluded the detention was 
not arbitrary, it rejected the Crown’s submission 
that the lawful detention of the driver and 
passengers in the vehicle gave the police the 
authority to question the driver and passengers for 
legitimate police purposes unconnected to the HTA 
investigation. In this case, there was no lawful 
authority for questioning the accused. He was a 
passenger in a vehicle in which the driver was being 
investigated for making an improper turn. He was not 
asked for identification in relation to any potential 
HTA violation. The officer wanted the information 
to conduct a CPIC query for any outstanding court 
orders and to record information about his 
movements. Had the officer had the authority to ask 
the accused for identification, the information could 
be used for other purposes, like checking CPIC or 
more general intelligence gathering purposes. 
However, this improper questioning did not render 
the accused’s detention as an incident to the HTA 
stop and investigation arbitrary or unlawful. 
The Seizure
Justice Doherty ruled that the accused’s s.8 Charter 
right was breached when the officer asked him to 
identify himself:
Section 8 of the Charter protects against 
unreasonable searches or seizures.  A seizure is a 
non-consensual taking by a state agent of anything 
in which the person asserting a s. 8 right has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.   The thing 
taken may be tangible or intangible.  Information 
can be seized.   At its most fundamental, s. 8 
preserves an individual zone of privacy against 
state intrusion.   The state can enter into that 
zone if the intrusion meets a reasonableness 
standard.
Answers to police questions 
may or may not give rise to 
a s. 8 claim.  As with other 
aspects of the s. 8 inquiry, a 
fact-specific examination 
of the circumstances is 
necessary.   Where the 
subject of the questioning 
is under police detention 
and reasonably believes 
that he or she is compelled 
to provide the information 
sought in the questions, I do 
“Where the subject of the questioning is 
under police detention and reasonably 
believes that he or she is compelled to 
provide the information sought in the 
questions, I do not think it distorts the 
concept of a seizure to describe the 
receipt of the information by the police 
as a non-consensual taking of that 
information from the detained person.”
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not think it distorts the concept of a 
seizure to describe the receipt of 
the information by the police as a 
non-consensual taking of that 
information from the detained 
person.   [references omitted, paras. 
33-34]
In this case, the seizure of the 
identification information was 
unreasonable. Justice Doherty found 
the request for identification and running it through 
CPIC was the functional equivalent of asking the 
accused “a series of questions about his criminal 
past, his bail status, and the terms of any bail” he 
might be under. The majority continued:
A person under police detention who is being 
asked to incriminate himself has more than a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect 
to the answers to any questions that are put to 
him by the police.   That person has a right to 
silence unless he or she makes an informed 
decision to waive that right and provide the 
requested information to the police. In the 
circumstances, [the accused’s] identification in 
response to the officer’s question constitutes a 
seizure and attracts s. 8 protection.
The seizure was unreasonable.   …[The officer] 
had no reason to suspect [the accused] of 
anything when he questioned him and requested 
his identification.  The purpose for the stop and 
the consequential detention of [the accused] and 
the other occupants of the vehicle had nothing to 
do with the request for [the accused’s] 
identification.   The purpose of the stop did not 
justify an at large inquiry into [the accused’s] 
background or his status in the criminal justice 
system.  That was the effect of the request for 
identification.   …[The officer] expanded a 
Highway Traffic Act stop into a broader and 
unrelated inquiry.  [The accused’s] identification 
of himself provided the entrée into that broader 
and unrelated inquiry.   
… If, as in this case, a request for identification 
is made in circumstances of detention in which 
the detained individual reasonably feels 
compelled to answer the request for 
identification, then the question assumes a 
coercive quality in the nature of a demand, which 
suggests a state seizure of the response. 
[references omitted, paras. 40-42]
The seizure of the identification 
information was warrantless and 
without reasonable cause and 
therefore breached s.8 of the 
Charter. It should be noted, that 
under the s.24(2) analysis Justice 
Doherty said that had the officer 
decided to give the accused a ticket 
for not wearing his seatbelt, he was 
entitled to ask for identification so he 
could issue the ticket. Further, he would have been 
entitled to conduct a CPIC inquiry using that 
identification. And had this occurred, the same 
results would have followed. In this case, however, 
the officer testified that his reason for asking for 
identification was part of his routine procedure. He 
did not understand that he needed a specific reason 
for requesting identification from the passenger nor 
advert his mind to the seatbelt violation. In other 
words, the officer had a lawful means to obtain 
identification (for the purpose of ticketing) and do 
exactly what he did. The officer, however, was wrong 
in proceeding on the basis he could ask for 
identification as part of his routine procedure in 
identifying passengers of stopped vehicles. 
Right to Counsel
The accused conceded that the police are not 
required to give s.10(b) rights during a brief lawful 
HTA roadside stop. Since the accused “was lawfully 
detained as part of a HTA brief roadside detention”  
it flowed that this detention did not trigger the 
rights set out in s. 10(b) of the Charter. Thus, the 
police did not offend s. 10(b) when the officer did 
not advise the accused of his right to counsel before 
asking him for identification. The absence of any 
advice about the right to counsel before asking for 
identification or whether he could refuse to provide 
identification, however, did further confirm that the 
officer’s request for identification was more of a 
demand for identification, which constituted a 
seizure. 
Admissibility
The majority found the trial judge erred in excluding 
the cocaine as evidence. The admission of the 
evidence would not affect the fairness of the trial. 
Nor was the breach serious enough to warrant 
“A person under police 
detention who is being 
asked to incriminate himself 
has more than a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with 
respect to the answers to 
any questions that are put to 
him by the police.”
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exclusion of the crucial and reliable evidence of a 
serious crime. Its admission would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.  
A Different Opinion
Justice O’Connor wrote a dissenting opinion. In his 
view there were no Charter breaches. He agreed 
that the officer had grounds to stop the vehicle and 
ask the driver for identification and also acted 
properly in directing the occupants to keep their 
hands where they could be seen. The officer had 
seen the accused moving his hands towards the small 
of his back and was understandably concerned about 
safety. However, unlike the majority, Justice 
O’Connor ruled that there was no s.8 violation. 
When asked for identification, nothing of a personal 
or confidential nature was revealed. Nor did it touch 
on a biographical core of personal information or 
disclose intimate details of lifestyle and personal 
choices. Justice O’Connor stated:
[The accused] had little, if any, expectation of 
privacy in his name.   People routinely identify 
themselves in a wide range of contexts and 
situations.   Generally, an individual’s identity is 
broadly known within his or her community and can 
be easily ascertained by others.  In this case, for 
example, [the officer] might have asked the 
driver or the other passenger for [the accused’s] 
name. 
To date, courts have not held that a person’s 
identity is constitutionally protected under s. 8 of 
the Charter….[paras. 90-91]
As for the CPIC check and what it revealed, Justice 
O’Connor went on to say:
[The officer] did not conduct an unreasonable 
search and seizure by obtaining the information 
about [the accused] contained in the CPIC 
system.  This information, which included the 
details of a bail order, had been entered into the 
system on an earlier date.  As a national repository 
of police information, CPIC is a vital shared 
resource within Canada law enforcement.  As such, 
maintaining the CPIC system is a normal law 
enforcement function. There is nothing improper 
for law enforcement agencies to maintain these 
types of records. Rather, doing so is an essential 
and important part of legitimate law enforcement 
activities.  The information that is in issue on this 
appeal, information about a bail order, originated 
in a public court process and as such, would be 
available in the court files.  The bail order is the 
paper record of the court reflecting the order 
made in a public courtroom.  Once entered in the 
CPIC system, this information was to be made 
available to law enforcement officers who had 
access to that system. 
In my view, an individual such as [the accused], 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
with respect to information in CPIC, at least 
insofar as police officers are concerned.   A 
reasonable and prudent individual would assume 
that information about him or her emanating from 
a public court process will be available to police 
officers through an information data system such 
as CPIC. [paras. 93-94] 
Justice O’Connor concluded that the question asking 
the accused to identify himself and the follow-up 
CPIC enquiry did not breach his privacy interest. 
Even if the accused felt compelled to identify 
himself, it did not turn what was otherwise 
constitutional into a s.8 Charter breach. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the evidence was 
admissible, the acquittals set aside, and a new trial 
was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (a) False—see R. v. Vandenbosch (at p. 14 of this 
publication). 
2. (c) Reasonable probability—see R. v. Mouland (at 
p. 4 of this publication). 
3. (b) False—see R. v. Washington (at p. 6 of this 
publication). 
4. (a) True—see R. v. Singh (at p. 27 of this 
publication). 
5. (a) True—see R. v. Tran  (at p. 23 of this 
publication). 
6. (a) British Columbia—see British Columbia: 
Canada’s Most Explosive Province (at p.  21 of the 
publication)  
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